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A RELIANCE DA.Iv1AGES APPROACH TC) 
CORPORA.TE LOCKUPS 
Prin ted in U.S.A. 
Yo!. 90. No.2 
Da vid A . Skeel, Jr.* 
INTROD U CTION 
To paraphrase a recent men's aftershave commercial , takeovers 
are back. Few expect the resurgence to reach 1980s leve ls , but merger 
activity clearly is on the rise again. 1 The widely followed Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QV C Network, Inc. 2 decision prominently re-
flected this recent shift. After earlier suggesting, in Paramount Com-
munications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. ,3 that directors have almost comple te 
discretion in responding to a takeover bid, Delaware now has made 
clear that the directors of a corporation that is a takeover target4 can-
not simply stonewall one suitor in favor of another, in an opinion that 
appears to breathe life back into the takeover-friendly Delaware deci-
sions of the mid 1980s .5 
A crucial issue in Paramount, and one that almost certainly will 
increase in importance if the recent propensity for negotiated mergers 
continues, is courts ' treatment of lockup provisions granted by a tar-
get's managers to a bidder. A lockup is a provision pursuant to which 
a target promises to compensate the bidder if their proposed sale fa lls 
* Associa te Professo r o f La w, Temple U nive rsity. I am grate ful to A lice Ab reu , G eorge 
Cohen, D ebo rah DeMott, Stephen Fraidin, Jon H anson , Marcel Kahan, Michael Klausne r, Bob 
Rasmussen, Ed Rock, and the part icipants a t a workshop at the Northweste rn Uni ve rsity Schoo l 
of Law fo r help ful comments on earlier dra fts. Financial support for this research was pro vided 
by the Tem ple Univers ity School of Law. 
1 See, e. g , Steven Lipin , Ai ergers and A cquisitions in First Quarter In creased 35 % fro m rhe 
Year Before, W A LL ST. J ., Apr. 4, 1995 , at A3; R andall Smith & Greg Steinmetz , Ofj w the Races: 
Mergers Surge as Firms Find a Rising Economy and Cheap Financing, W ALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 
1994, at Al; News R oundup, Big Is Back in Sry/e as Corporate America Deals, Buys and i\Ierges , 
W A L L ST. L Aug. 4, 1994, at Al. 
2 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
3 571 A.2d 1140 (D el. 1989). 
4 The te rm ''bidde r" will be used throughout the Article to denote an ind ivid ual o r corpo ra-
tion seeking to acq uire anoth er corporation , which will be referred to as the " ta rge t," e ither 
through a negoti at ed m erger, a tende r offer, or by other m eans . 
5 The effect of Paramount v. Q VC itse lf should not be overstated . ln a subseq uent ta keove r 
decision , the D elaware Suprem e Court upheld man agerial defensive tactics. Unitrin, Inc. v. 
A merican G en. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). Yet Paramount made cle ar tha t there still are 
limits to ta rget directors' ability to thwart a takeover. Moreove r, the resurgence in takeove rs 
tha t began shortly before Param ount has continued. 
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through. 6 Traditionally, courts have been skeptical of lockups, fear-
ing, among other things, rnanagerial self-dealing-that the managers 
of a target firm will make exorbitant concessions in return for special 
treatment for themselves in connection with the transaction. As a re-
sult, courts have scrutinized lockups on an ad hoc basis, enforcing 
those that appear reasonable and striking down those that do notJ 
vVhile commentators have proposed various ways to simplify the scru·· 
tiny, nearly all have called for some kind of winnowing process that 
upholds some lockups but not others:'' 
In a provocative and ambitious recent article, "Toward Unlocking 
Lockups," 9 Stephen Fraidin and Jon Hanson insist that the conven-
tional approach to lockups is wholly misguided. Fraidin and H anson 
contend that there is no reason to strike down a lockup arrangement 
unless it both provides excessive compensation to the recipient 
("lockup") bidder and forecloses other, higher valuing bidders from 
bidding for the target.l0 In their view, the managers of a target have 
every reason to seek out the highest possible bidder. But even if they 
did not, and were inclined to act disloyally, the managers simply can-
not prevent the highest valuing bidder from ending up with the target. 
A higher valuing bidder will either outbid the lockup bidder or, if the 
lockup is so excessive that it prevents this, will make a deal with the 
lockup bidder as soon as the lockup bidder has acquired the target. 11 
Based on their view that lockups will not prevent the best bidder from 
winning, Fraidin and Hanson conclude that courts should enforce 
every lockup, without exception. 
As this brief description suggests, Fraidin and Hanson's analysis 
can be seen as a straightforward application to corporate lockups of 
6 Throughout the Article, I use the term "lockup" broadly, intending to encompass any 
provision that has this effect, including stock option agreements ("stock lockups"), options to 
purchase specified assets ("asset lockups"), and termination or breakup fees. "Lockup" can be a 
misnomer, since the provision may, but also may not, make it prohibitively expensive for other 
parties to try to bid on the target, thus locking up the deal between the target and a bidder. 
7 For descriptions of some of the Delaware lockup cases, see infra note 93. 
8 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Analyzing SiOck Lock-ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Fa-
cilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 CoLUtvl. L. REv. 682 (1990) (court scrutiny of lockups that clearly 
"overinsure" the bidder); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in 
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REv. 239 (1990)(favoring presumptively striking 
down lockups involving more than 10% of target's stock unless they are preceded by an auc-
tion); see also Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siege!, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of 
Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 315 (1987). 
9 Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739 
(1994). 
10 !d. at 1784. I have borrowed the term "lockup bidder" from a new article by Marcel 
Kahan and Michael Klausner. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for 
Control (July 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Northwestern University Law 
Review). 
11 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1788-89. 
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the Coase TI1eorem's suggestion that private parties will always bar-
gain to an efficient solution in the absence of transaction costs. 12 Frai-
,. 'T T • , • ) • e ,• , " G:Il anG .c-1anson do nm deny we ex1stence or tnmsacuon costs. un 
,_., ___ r----·-- ·t-~a··-· ,.;.l"'" rr-'·- v-·lecL-,a ·' 1-l :::~~ ·t'~a mul-r1'p le sal"'" +~el·r a"-"' 1 s· s ' .. \ . .'.;::; ·-'.!.lL.l.ly, u.cy Clvi'.UOW s'~ ll ctl il<..- 1. - .·.::~ LH l.ul y 1 
C'Ji"rtemplates v;ould entail co- ts, but they conclude that the costs 
1 J ., • ' d h ' 0 d 1 • h ,.-, ' b Vi'!tLa oe quite lOW, an t e gams trom tra e mg . ''-'onsequentty, Le 
,.-,_.. . .... . - ~n:n J .. ) .. :q·· nn~-1; TIO th at th Q~/ anV~S;On ~'/OU 1 fi .... 0 Ut1-ro e1 y t':\ke O L-.,-..p 
··-/,)"!,,)-',QJ.!. ,__-::c.,::;c;lL l -'-b d • 1 '~ • '-' -'-' 1, 1 .i Y' . 1- l ' Lll • a. L 12:\>..-v. 
- r ~ :.~ .;,::' ;\ --~- !-~ r. 1 P ·n-"'ODO'" eS ~ DeT a DD-r-: "Ct, lr~ .-. 07'-:-'-).n. - a ~lA loc1ru~r n-~~.o __ ,_ "'·"'' cu "' v !. ·~ l-0 " i "' Cl . .• ' 'tf ' l 1 Ua. l! -'J 'v 1 .l-' -• i ..... 1> i_).") ' J .l! ...... 
. ~ :.-~a~ ·jjffe:rs i :~l strik.ing respects botl1 fror:n Fraidin a11d Hanson's analy-
5 ~3 o.:nd ftom that of previous cornmentators. TI1e Article begins by 
::~·~:::;J ,Jcing ·~he existing Iiterature o:n corporate lockups. It focuses in 
pa.nicular on Fraidin and H anson's optlinistic view of the effec t of a 
J.os.1m p provision, both because cheir analysis suggests important new 
insights as to the nature of lockups, and because it offers a useful vehi-
cle for assessing the benefits lockups offer and the concerns they raise . 
Drawing extensively from contract theory and doctrine, the Arti-
cle then sketches an alternative approach to lockups, which is referred 
to as a "reliance damages model." Like the conventional view of lock-
ups, and unlike Fraidin and Hanson's perspective, this model relies on 
court scrutiny of lockups to distinguish between those that should, and 
those that should not, be enforced. The model diverges from previous 
commentary, hmvever, in that it focuses on a bidder's reliance interest 
rather than its expectancy or the generai "reasonableness" of the 
lockup, and in the model's contention that a bidder should be entitled 
to prove its actual damages if its lockup provision is struck down. 
1ne analogy to contract law is an obvious one. As any first-year 
Con~racts s~udent -vvould recognize, and as courts and commentators 
frequently point out,B lockups are closely analogous to the liquidated 
damages provisions used in other contract settings. Yet, prior to Frai-
din a:nd :Hanson, commentators had largely neglected the extensive 
hteratu-ce and case law on liquidated damages and other contract is-
sue3 once they actually began to analyze corporate lockups. 14 This 
11 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cos/, 3 J.L & EcoN. 1 (1960). One of the 
iwnies of this classic article is that Coase not only does not explicitl y art icula te what has come to 
be known as the "Coase Theorem," but he also intend ed to focus more on the importance of 
trr-nsaction costs than on the efficacy of private ordering in their absence. For a fascinating 
exploration of the Coase Theorem and some of its limitations, see Robert Cooter, The Cost of 
Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 1 (1982); see also Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer! 
Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlem ent Allocation, 46 STAN. L REv. 663 
(199t:-)(arguing that offer/asking price gaps may undermine Coase's invariance proposition). 
13 See, e.g., QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (DeL Ch. 
1993), ajf'd, 637 A.2d 34 (DeL 1994) ($100 million terrnination fee is a "fair liquidated amount to 
cover [the bidder's] expenses should the ... merger not be consummated"); Bainbridge, supra 
note 8, at 286. 
14 Ian Ayres's art icie on lockups is both an exception to and an illustration of this point. 
Ayres, supra note 8. Ayres is a prominent contracts scholar in addition to his work in corporate 
law, and his analysis of the "insurance" effects of lockup provi sions tracks an aspect of the eco-
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Article takes the insights of contract theory and law in a di:fferem, and 
in my view compelling, direction. 
Part I of the Article reviews several of the benefits that Fraidin 
and Hanson and o ther commentators attribute to lockups. The Arti-
cle then shifts to the dark side of lockups and demonstrates in Part H 
that despite their apparent incen tive to grant only appropriate Iock-
u ps, even "loyal" managers of a target rna y neverthe less offer an ex-
cessivc lockup clue to mistake or collusion. Part In s.rgues that 
Fraidin and H ansGn's conclusion that Coasian barg2jnir:g ·:;vcu kl Die-
vent lockups from foreclosing higher valuing bidd~rs is rnistaken ~and 
·would pose serious process problems for corporate decisionmaking 
even if it were not. After briefly considering the possibility of invali-
dating all lockups. the final Part proposes and exarn.ines 1.ny reliance 
damages model. 
T 
i. T HE BENEFITS OF LOCKU PS 
The suggestion that lockups can serve a beneficial role in corpo-
rate acquisitions is noncontroversial-nearly all of the commentators 
agree that lockups may offer important benefits. This Part begins by 
assessing Fraidin and Hanson's account of lockup benefits because 
Fraidin and H anson challenge conventional explanations as to what 
these arrangements can and cannot do , and because the relative im-
portance and plausibility of the benefits will play an im portant role in 
our consideration of the very different reliance damages approach to 
lockups proposed in Part IV.1s 
A. Traditional Justifications: Compensation for the Costs of Bidding 
Commentators traditionally have justifi ed lockups as a means of 
compensating a bidder for the costs it incurs in bidding. Th.ese costs 
can be viewed as comprising two kinds of expenses: first, the costs to 
the bidder of its initial investigation and the negotiations leading up to 
an agreement with the target and second, the costs a bidder faces after 
the agreement has been signed, during the inevitable delay in consum-
mating the agreement. 16 A bidder's post-bid costs include the risk 
nomic lite rature on contracts to some extent, but Ayres mak es few explicit connections to con-
tract law and theory. 
15 The analysis that follows assesses all but two of the benefits that Fraidin and H anson 
discuss. I consider collusive contracting in section II.B.2, and I omi t direct discussion of th eir 
critique of previous commentators' views of lockups as compensation for target breach beca use 
th is analysis closely tracks their contention tha t lockups a re unli ke ly eve r to foreclose a highe r 
valuing bidde r, a conclusion I chall enge in subpart III.A. 
16 Once a bidder has signed a merger agreement with the targe t 's manage rs, the agreement 
ordinaril y must be vo ted on by the target 's shareholders, which takes a minimum of 20 days and 
usually substantially longe r. See, e.g., D EL CooE A NN. tit 8, § 25l(c) (Supp. 1995). Simi larly, if 
the bidder makes a tend e r offe r directly to the target shareholders, the Williams A ct requires 
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that the target w1ll abandon the deal in favor of a new offer tha t 
PIT•er~"'.-. ar~tc l' t1-o -.-· r;r J- ~o.- I'C.. '-' 0 ~-· ·:'!rr-r-c..pme1Tt bl' ~ 'oo.J:nre· th p "-' l~l"'l" f:::. ~--, 0 1 (1 -~"- ·' !:,'-'.:> - -·---· •• !•~ i-Jcl .• Lg_.C) . Cd'-" <1. "• .:::,'- ~~ - H ' Ltl ·~1'-.. u ~ J l C·. -~11 1 l 
ers of the target have voted on the agreement. By offering ;::, k;ckup , 
commentators have argued, a target can encourage the bidder to incur 
the expense of bidding and properly compensate it for its losses in the 
event the deal subsequently faUs through. 17 
Fraidin ancl Hanson dismiss the conventional view as implausible 
. 1 1 ,... " ~ • ,-1 ~ .. . t 
w1tn respect to tne nrst type C'i: (_;os ts--pre-blu costs- due to a logical 
inconsis tencv thev detect in t he exulanation . Hmvever acorom~ate a 
· ' ,.1 J. ! l • 1 . . ~ 1 • ' 1 0 ~ 0 • 0 1 
podcy 1t may be to encourage OldGmg uy prormsmg to rerrno1Jrse a 
bidder's costs , lockups are unl.ikelv to serve this ourpose bec;:wse 
~ .I L ~ 
d r , "j r ' . , l . d ' . . ., targets _~) not gran·\. tr1err1 tlrl 'l: l .l a.rler a OlGLer a1rea y .nas 111Ct..trr~:>J tne 
costs.1s The argument has obvious force, but it is far fro:m fated w the 
traditional view. Loclmps still may play some role, even 'Nith respect 
to already incurred costs, if lockups are sufficiently prevalent !hat a 
bidder can expect to receive one if it reaches agreement with the tar-
get. In such a regime, a bidder could insist on a lockup as a prerequi-
site to entering into any agreement. Moreover, to the extent a lockup 
might plausibly com pensate a bidder for anticipated post-bid costs, as 
I argue below, a bidder is likely also to insist that the lockup cover 
previous ly incurred expenses. 
Fraidin and Hanson 's dismissal of the second half of the tradi-
tional justification- that lockups compensate a bidder fo r the risks it 
faces due to nost-bid delay--is even more moblematic. Fraidin and 
l • 
Hanson allude to the costs that a bidder may incur during this period 
of time, but then consider only the risk that the merger may become 
"unattractive" to the bidder during the lagtime before its consumma-
tion.19 Thev ignore the more obvious risk that the bidder mav face 
J ~ -
costs, such as the expenses of conducting additional investigation and 
devoting further executive time to the transaction, in connection. with 
a merger that remains every bit as attractive as it was initially. Lock-
ups serve as an excellen t means of reimbursing the lockup bidder for 
the costs it will incur if a new bidder emerges and the lockup bidder 
contests (but loses to, thus triggering the lockup) the new bid because 
it 'Nould :rather not abandon the transaction. 
B. Counteracting Uncerta inty: Differing Expectations and 
Risk Aversion 
In contrast to their skepticism about the conventional justifica-
tions for lockups, Fraidin and H anson view lockups as a desirable 
that it be kept open at !east 20 days, and extended at least 10 additional days aft er any sign ificant 
change in the offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1993). 
17 Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 242. 
18 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1815. 
19 Jd. at 1816 -1 7. 
568 
90:564 (1996) Corporate Lockups 
means of facilitating agreement when the costs of uncertainty might 
otherwise scuttle the deal. In particular, if a bidder and target have 
different expectations about the likely outcome of an auction, or if 
one party is risk averse, a lockup can increase the likelihood that the 
parties will come to terms on a mutually beneficial sale .2o 
To appreciate Fraidin an d Hanson's point about differing expec-
tations, assume tha t a bidder is willing to pay $1.50 for the target, bu t 
believes that another bidder would go as high as $175 in an open auc-
tion. In contrast , the target's managers, who would accept any offer 
that exceeded $100, suspect that no other bidder values it at more 
than $125, and that this. is what aE auction would bring. On these 
facts, both parties would benefit if the target's managers agreed to sell 
the firm to the initi al bidder for $150, and gave the bidder an enforce-
able lockup in order to protect it against the emergence of the higher 
bidder it fears. Absent the lockup, the deal might fall through due to 
the initial bidder 's unwillingness to enter a bidding contest it expects 
to lose. 
It is at least plausible that this account may accord with the dy-
namic of actual transactions. Target firms often negotiate privately 
with several possible bidders, and a bidder may well know which other 
firms the target has spoken to.21 If the target's discussions persuade it 
that the initial bidder values it most, but this bidder's knowledge of 
the other firms leads it to suspect otherwise, both parties may benefit 
from a negotiated merger and lockup agreement. Yet it seems ques-
tionable whether differing expectations are iikely to be the sole, or 
even the primary, impetus for a lockup in any given case, due to the 
signalling problems they may create. A bidder who suspects that the 
target is willing to agree to a lockup due to its pessimistic view of the 
likely outcome of an auction may decide to lower its bid. Similarly, a 
target dealing with a pessimistic bidder has an incentive to conduct an 
20 !d. at 1822 (diffe ring expectations); id. at 1823 (risk ave rsion). 
21 The contest to acquire G rumman Indust ri es in Spring 1994 illustrates this point. Martin 
Marietta entered into a merger agreement with G rumman, but subsequently dropped out when 
Northrop (who, as Martin Marietta well knew, had previously engaged in me rger discussions 
with Grumman) mad e a highe r bid. See, e.g., Jeff Cole, Northrop Seeks Grumman in HosTile 
$2.04 Billion Bid-Deal Ser Earlier in Week wirh Martin Marietta Is Topped by $5 a Share, WALL 
ST. J. , Mar. 11, 1994, at A3. If Martin Marietta (which la ter m erged with Lockheed) was in fact 
the highest bidde r and mistakenl y thought it would lose a bidding contest to Northrop , Grum· 
man theo retically could have granted Martin Marietta a large lockup in re turn for a high bid. (In 
actuality, Grumman granted a re latively small , $50 million termination fee .) In fact, Martin Ma r-
ietta 's apparent refusal ever to engage in auctions theore tically wo uld have made th is use of a 
lockup valuable to any target whose managers believed that Martin Marietta was the highest 
valuing bidder. On th e other hand , if Martin Marietta was nor th e high est valuing bidder and the 
lockup e ffectively precl uded better bidders, the lockup would have a malignant rather than ben -
eficia! effect. Part III of this A rticle discusses th ese kinds of problems. 
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additional search for other, higher valuing bidders if the target is able 
to detect the bidder's pessimism.22 
Fraidin and H anson also suggest that a lockup can prove benefi-
cial if one or both of the parties is risk averse. If the bidder is risk 
a.verse, the parties can agree to a lockup that guarantees the bidder its 
expected profits in the event a higher bidder appears, thus shifting the 
un.cert::tinty as to the existence or amount of a higher bid to the tar-
g~t.23 If the target rather than the bidder is risk averse, a lockup could 
"llSO be calibrated to assure that th e target receives a fixed return and 
~: t1 2.t the bidder bears a ll of the r isk. 24 As with differing expectations, 
t \1is account of lockups is subj ect to significant questions on inspec-
~ion . Lockups seem better calibrated to address bidder risk aversion 
(han target risk aversion , for instance, and it is not clear why a bidder 
·.,voulcl be more concerned about a merger deal that falls through than 
the apparently m uch greater uncertainti es of a merger it actually con-
summates, as I discuss in somewhat greater detail below.25 In short , 
differing expectations and bidder risk aversion, while plausible, seem 
less compelling than the more prosaic traditional justification for 
lockups. 
C. Encouraging Search 
Lockups can be viewed as encouraging search by bidders and 
targets in a variety of ways. In a general sense, if a regime that en-
forces lockups is preferable to one that does not, lockups will en-
courage search by each of the interested parties by increasing the 
gains available from these kinds of transactions.26 
In addition to noting this generally beneficial effect on search, 
Fraidin and H anson also argue that lockups can give bidders a sub-
stantial, direct incentive to engage in post-bid search. If the target 
gives a bidder a lockup whose effect is to foreclose all other bidders, 
that bidder itself will benefit if it finds someone else who values the 
target more than it does, since the bidder could consummate its 
purchase of the target and then immediately resell the target at a 
2 2 It is also interesting to note that the differing expectations analysis arguably is in tension 
with the economic literature on settlements, which predicts that parties will often fail to reach 
agreement if they disagree about the likely outcome of litigation. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, 
Smlemem and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods fo r the Allocation of 
Legal CoSlS , 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 55 (1982). My thanks to Geo rge Cohen for bringing these issues 
to my attention. 
23 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1823. For an insightful analysis of the ways in which 
coniract damages provisions can be used to a ll oca te risk, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing 
Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. L E GAL STUD. 427 (1983). 
24 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1823. 
25 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
26 See supra note 17 for a closely ana logous point. 
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profi t. 27 In a sense, as the authors point out, the lockup gives the bid-
der an incentive to act as a sales agent with respect to the target firm , 
which may be desirable if the bidder has more information about the 
relevant market than the target does. 28 On the other hand, a lockup is 
unnecessary for this purpose if the target is likely to be a better seller 
i:han the bidder would be, and it seems doubtful that targe ts would 
grant a lockup with the bidder 's selling expertise in mind except on 
rare occasions.2 9 Moreover, even the genera l argument that honoring 
lockups -..vill encourage search is more problematic than it initially ap-
pears. While lockups will encourage search to the exten t that target 
managers grant lockups to unsolicited bidders, a target also can use a 
lockuo to th·-.vart an unwanted offer bv granting the lockun to a fa-
i .I ......... ,___, 1 
vored bidder.30 ~fhe possibility that lockups \vill be used defensively 
suggests that they sometimes may have a chilling effect on takeover 
activity and thus undermine the incentive to search. 
D. Enhancing the Effectiveness of an Auction Process 
One final benefit suggested by Fraidin and Hanson comes in the 
context of an auction. In a common values auction-that is, an auc-
tion where the target is likely to hold roughly the same value to all 
bidders31-bidders may refrain from bidding for fear they will lose 
money regardless of whether they win the auction. 32 Fraidin and Han-
son suggest that, in such a context, a target can use a lockup as a 
momise to reimburse a bidder for its costs in the event it loses the 
i 
auction, and thus as a means of encouraging an otherwise reluctant 
bidder to enter an auction.33 Despite several commentators' sugges-
tions to the contrary, corporate acquisitions seem unlikely ever to 
27 Frai din & H anson , supra note 9, at 1788-89. 
2S !d. at 1827. 
29 For an example o f such an exceptional case , see In re KDI Co rp. Sha re holde rs Litig., No. 
10,278, 1988 D el. C h. L E XIS 143 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988). In KDI, the principal shareholders o f 
th e K DI co rpo ration (who held 49.5 % of the stock) , agreed to tende r their sha res into a bidde r 's 
offer, pursuant to an agreement that required the bidde r to pay them 50 % of any high e r price 
the bidde r received on the resale of KDI within one year. !d. 
30 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 10. 
31 See Pete r Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using AuClion Th eory ro Inform Takeover Regula-
tion , 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 27, 28-30 (1991) (describing "common values" and "inde pendent 
values" aucti ons) . 
32 The problem is th a t, once it has incurred sunk costs investigating the target and preparing 
its bid , a bidde r !mows it loses these costs if it loses the auction. The bidder the refore will bid up 
to the valu e of the targe t, witho ut regard to its costs. If this bid wins, th e bidder still will ha ve 
lost an am ount equal to the amount of its costs. !d. at 33. 
33 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1829-30; cf Bruce A. Mark ell , The Case Againsr 
Breakup Fees in Bankruprcy , 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (1 992) (questi oning wheth e r brea kup o r 
te rmination fe es a re n ecessary to induce bidding in th e bankruptcy contex t) . 
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truly be a common values auction.34 But lockups offer similar benefits 
in the independent values context: in particular, lockups can help to 
"~·l·rnn1 8 L·-;::;. -h;...-1'~l· ,,c,- ]5 
,') '~ .:.. •• •..L .l. -.. .. """ ulU~t i..._E:> ' 
This brief overvie\v of the role of lockups suggests that, despite its 
limitations , the conventiona l view of lockups still seems to be the bes t 
account of their benefi ts. Of the additional benefits postulated by 
J:=ro.id in and Hansor1 , the last--enhancing an auction-----0Ctr.allels ti1e 
~ " 
j"Y'·>d it i o re~l v i ~w in ffi?.I1'Y ra •;:!)'''"ts VVl'~ilP d if f orj 'l Cf c. ·;,T·F·('t~;-in·qc: .. :-;:t· 
• .1. {.A. ,.J:~. L l_i G 'I ...._._- . 1 - - l. L \.,.-._,
1 
VV l. ~ • l. __. .-. . \ ..,.....!,. 1 -e:: 1,.., , 'f-1 '.-' ,, ~ - _.;, ..__,. •-'·- ,_)~ .l. ..:. '-'~"' .. 
,-,-/"'" ; On "'11d Pnh ·~ nc; n o ·-pa-ch a 1l l-. r:la1 concop'[''lnj ·;yf'y roro·' ;.~ . ..- ~, r.,~'-c 6. ..._, _,_::)! J.' 0. ~ l vt lL._ c:. l -.L.o..ib J _, }. ~. 1 1 . ! lV .._ _ l_ Q.( ::. . ;. • . .! :1.·:...-L','·--'-'-.: ') ~ ... C'.·~ ... .l .:. 
oroves moblematic on insDection,36 and will Drove o.ore so "~:s v;.c:.: con·· 
..1. 1._ !. .:. 
si:Jer the dark side of lockups . 
II. E XCESS LVE DAMAG ES AND OTHER PROB LElviS -\i\fi-.CI-I }_,(_J ,C l( lJPS 
Lockups clearly can be used for beneficial purposes. The ques-
tion, then, is will they be? If the parties invariably employ lockups in 
an appropriate fashion, Fraidin and Hanson are justified in concluding 
tha t there is no reason for courts to scrutinize them. 
Previous commentators have argued that the managers of a target 
firm suffer from serious conflict of interest problems, and as a result 
will often grant excessive lockups as a means of privileging a favored 
bidderY Fraidin and Hanson question whether managers' incentives 
34 Cramton and Schwartz suggest that takeover contests often will be a common vaiues auc-
tion if all bidders' principal objective is to replace th e targe t 's existing managers. Cramton & 
Schwartz, supra note 31 , a t 47. Even in this con text , however, different bidders inevitably wo uld 
implement diffe rent strategies and managem ent personnel and thus are like ly to value the !arge t 
diffe rentl y. 
If an auction was in fact comm on valu es, the target would do better w negoti a te a merger 
with a single bidder, rather th an to conduct an auction, since adding bidders 'rio uid incr.:as':: costs 
with out gene ra ting offsetting benefits. Delaware law limits a t arge t' s abilit y to take ouch a tack, 
du e to its bias toward auctions. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs and Prop .. 
erry Righrs in Corporace Assers, 25 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 85 (1990). 
35 I d. Notice that this reasoning is partially undermined by th e same kinds or problems Frai-
din a nd Hanson att ribute to th e conventional justification for locku ps: a bidder wouid not re-
ce ive the lockup Lintil afcer it had already incurred the costs of deciding whether w m ake a 
pa rticula r bid. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
This is not surprising given that the conventiona l justification for lock ups and the auction 
argument are closely re lated, as noted be low. In a sense, th e conventi onal justification applies 
wh en a target grants a lockup to the initial bidder, and the auction argument often relates to 
lockups given to second or subsequ ent bidders. 
36 The limitations of these justifications do not undermine the general case fo r aliowing lock-
ups in some contexts, but they do have important implications for court treatment of lockups, as 
discussed in more detail in Part IV. One implication worth noting now is that, unlike previous 
commentators' view of lockups, these new justifications purport to even validate lockups th at 
would give a bidder more than its "expectation" damages. To the extent the new justificati ons 
are problematic, these shortcomings therefore ra ise doubts about th e appropriateness of supra-
expectancy lockups. 
37 See, e.g. , Bainbrid ge , supra note 8, at 251. 
572 
90:564 (1996) Corporate L ockups 
do in fact deviate from those of target shareholders,Js and assume that 
" loyal" man agers will invariably grant "compensatory" lockups-
lockups that obtain f(-,r the target shareholders as much in benefits ., 
such as a higher bid or better terms, as the shareholders relinquish in 
potential dama ges should the lockup be triggered. 
This Part argues, contrary to Fraidin and Hanson's assumption, 
th::~t even " loyal" man agers may grant excessive lockups in many con-
texts. FirsT, hmvever, I should clarify what I mean by appropriate, as 
ormosed to ~;xc•~: s;ive or mali::znan t lockuvs, and define the terms I will 
l ~ ,_., l 
use for the ;·err:a!nd.er of the Article . 
Comrne~1tat,_,rs frequent ly characterize appropriate lockups as 
those ptt rSL'ant to which the bidder and target receive rov.gh ly 
equivalent benetlls , and malignant lockups as those that aooear to 
benefit the bidder at the expense of the target. I will adopt~· similar 
strategy in this Part, since the Part is concerned with the question 
whether target managers will ever enter into bad lockups. I will refer 
to such a lockup, one that benefits a bidder at the expense of the tar-
get, as "ma lignant" or "excessive. " In subsequent Parts, I also will 
occasionally refer to lockups as "supra-expectancy" lockups to de-
scribe a lockup that promises a bidder more than its anticipated prof-
its from the acquisition. O ther commentators have assumed, as do I, 
that supra-expectancy lockups are excessive because of the for eclosing 
effect such lockups can have on higher valuing bidders.39 Thus, supra-
expectancy lockups can be seen as a particular kind of excessive or 
malignant lockup. 
Although commentators often purport to consider whether a 
lockup gives equivalent benefits to the bidder and the target, as I will 
clo in-this Part, \vhen it comes to their specific proposals , commenta-
tors have usually focused on the amount of compensation the bidder 
\Vi ll receive under the lockup. This focus on bidder compensation is 
both uns urprising and justifi ed, given that lockups act very much like 
a liquidated damages provision for the bidder.40 The reliance dam-
ages approach set forth in Part IV aiso focuses on bidder compensa-
tion, although it calls fo r a very different kind of inquiry.4 1 
38 See, e.g, Fraidin & Hanson, supra not e 9, a t 1785-87. 
39 See infra nore 84. Although one can imagine supra-expectancy lock ups th at a re not mal ig-
nant , several factors-the ch illing effect lockups have on other bids, the problems discussed in 
thi s Part, and the fact that a supra-ex pectancy lock up is not necessary to achi eve the primary 
benefits of a lock up- suggest th at supra-expectancy lock ups routinely will be excessive . 
40 Ian Ayres suggests that any amount greater than " full insurance" is inappropriately gener-
ous, for instance, and defines ''full insurance" in terms of a bidder 's expectancy interest. Ayres, 
supra note 8, at 704-07. That is, he suggests that a lockup is appropriate so long as it does not 
provide to a bidder more than the profi ts it would have received had its deal with th e targe t gone 
through-a standard similar to the traditional expectation measure of contract damages. 
41 ln addit ion to focusing on the amount of compensa tion a lockup gives the bidder, De la-
ware court s sometimes purpo rt to consider what the target receives in exchange. See, e.g. , Mills 
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A. Duty of Loyalty Concerns 
The principal reason for courts' and commentators' longstanding 
hostility to lockups is their fear that managers of a target face a severe 
conflict of interest in the acquisition context.42 Under this view, lock-
ups may exacerbate managers' inclination to focus less on sharehold-
ers ' welfare than on protecting their own jobs when a target is being 
soid. By granting an excessively generous lockup to the bidder that 
ser::ms most sensitive to their concerns, the managers of a target can 
ensure that the favored bidder wins out, even if another bidder wouid 
otherwise offer more.4 3 
Commentators have suggested various solutions to the confl ict of 
interest problem, such as presumptively invalidating any lockup that 
affects more than ten percent of a target's assets unless it has first 
been subject to the market test of an auction.44 Delaware's most re-
cent pronouncement is even stricter, suggesting an almost complete 
dist rust of target managers' motives in the lockup context.45 
Fraidin and Hanson contend that the widespread concerns about 
managerial loyalty are misguided. Because managers frequently own 
substantial amounts of stock, they have a direct financial incentive to 
sell a target to the highest bidder.46 Moreover, even if managers were 
thoroughly disloyal and interested only in job protection, they still 
would seek out the highest bidder, since the highest bidder could 
match any side deal offered by a lesser bidder.47 
Fraidin and Hanson are persuasive in arguing that overt disloy-
alty seems less pervasive than many commentators have assumed, and 
that loyalty concerns do not justify a blanket judicial refusal to enforce 
Acquisition v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988) (considering whether target received a 
'·substantial benefit"). Because it is extreme ly difficult to isolate the benefits a target receives in 
connection with a lockup, focusing on th e bidder's damages is a more useful and manageable 
approach, as in other liquidated damages contexts. 
42 The classic early statement, al though it involved tak eover defenses rather than lockups , 
was the Delaware Supreme Court's suggestion in Unocal that the "omnipresent specter that a 
boa rd may be acting primarily in its own interests" necessitated special scrutiny of directors' 
actions in the takeover context. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A .2d 946 (Dei. 1985). 
43 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183-84 (Del. 
1986); Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 273-74. 
44 Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 323-24; see also Johnson & Siegel, sup ra note 8 (calling for 
shareholder vote with respect to significant lockups). 
45 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 50-51 (Del. 1994). 
The court in Paramount was so hostile to the lockup arrangement Paramount and Viacom had 
agreed to in that case that parti es have subsequently shied away from stock lockups, though 
bidde rs contin ue to negotiate for termination fees. See Greg Steinmetz, Stock-Option Lockups 
are Absent from Takeover Deals, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1994, at Cl. 
46 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1804-05. 
47 !d. at 1785. 
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lockups.48 Consequently, overt disloyalty can and should be dealt 
wi th separately, as proposed in the "reliance damages" m odel in Part 
IV. 
B ut to suggest that disloyalty never interferes vvith m anagerial 
decisionmaking in this context seems seriously mistaken. Moreover , 
even nominally "loyal" managers may be prone to granting excessive 
lockuos. The remainder of this Part considers several rea.sons •NhV ex-' . 
cessive lockups are a very real concern. In connection ~~~; ith this dis-
cussion , I also no te some of the perverse conseq<Jcnses oi excessive 
. k toe, _ ups. 
B. Why "Loyal" Managers May Gram Excr::ssive Lockups 
Fraidin and H anson suggest that there is nothing ':o 'Nmry about 
once we have taken overt disloyalty problems into account. They as-
sume that so long as it is loyal, a board will never agree to an inappro-
priate lockup . According to Fraidin and H anson, their assumption 
"can be justified on the ground that courts are in no position . .. [to] 
second guess the decisions of loyal boards. "49 Even if Fraidin and 
H anson's dim view of judicial competence is justifi ed, an issue ex-
plored in detail in the following Part, the question whether and how 
frequently "loyal" boards grant malignant lockups has critical im plica-
tions for their insistence that the benefits of lockups are not offset by 
any conceivable harm. 
The analysis below describes two contexts where even "loyal" 
managers may grant excessive lockups. Together with the possibility 
of disloyai behavior by target managers, the analysis suggests substan-
tial grounds for concern. 
1. l'vfanagerial Afistakes in the Bargaining Process. - An obvious, 
and potentially widespread, source of excessive lockups is that a tar-
get's managers may simply make a mistake; that is, that the m anagers 
may miscalculate the amount that a bidder has at stake or the value of 
the lockup that the parties agree to. Managers can make miscalcula-
tions in any context where they stipulate damages, of course, but the 
risk that mistakes will lead to excessively generous damages seems 
particularly high with lockups. 
First, stock lockups can be particularly difficult to value becartse 
the parties may have little way of knowing what the upper value m ay 
be (since this will be determined by the winning bid of a bidder who 
48 Even if the deal as a whole is tainted , a lockup provi sion may play a va luable ro le in 
promoting bidding if it is limited to an appropriate amount. Consequently, Delaware 's tendency 
to void lockups altogether in such contexts, based on a conclusion that th ey are part of an "over-
a ll pattern" of inappropriate behavior, seems misguided. See, e.g., Rev/on , 506 A. 2d at 184. l 
offer what I vi ew as a superior approach in Part IV. 
49 Fraidin & Hanson , supra note 9, at 1745 n.l6. 
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may not initially be known to either party).50 In theory , the amount of 
a higher bidder's final bid is related to the lockup bidder's reservation 
price, since the 1vinning bid in an auction ordinarily should equat (or 
barely exceed) the reservation price of the second highest bidder. But 
it is unclear whether this in fact is true in practice in the corpor·ate 
acquisition context. The nev,r bidder's presence may alter the lockup 
bidder's reservation price, fo r example, or the new bidder may offer 
mere than this price if the auction is not an E nglish (that is, increasing 
' . _..l' • -· r~ ' £ 1 • • h d 1 1 ' o:u) auction.=>: Hms , even u tne part1es iVlS e to corre ate ;ocKup 
clarnages in some fasrt ion vvith the lockup bidder's reservation price,52 
the higher bidder's final bid mz.y not be an appropriate surrog2te fo r 
this amount , and the problem is com pounded by the fact that a lockup 
ordinarily cannot affect more than twenty percent of a targe t's stock .5 3 
The second fac tor indirectly returns us to the question of manage-
ria l loyalty. However loyal managers may otherwise be to target 
shareholders, they fr equently will have an implicit preference fo r one 
bidder over another. Such preferences could play a role on the mar-
gin in any transaction a corporation enters into, but they take on par-
ticular significance in the acquisition context, since acquisitions affect 
the very nature of the enterprise. In Revlon, for instance, it was no 
secret that Michel Bergerac, Revlon 's chief executive, viewed suitor 
Ronald Perelman with deep animosity.54 Similarly, in the recent con-
test for Paramount, newspapers widely reported that Paramount's 
Martin Davis enjoyed far more cordial relations v;ith Sumner Red-
stone of Viacom than he did with Barry Diller, the CEO of QVC, 
Paramount's other suitor. 55 
In short, managers of a target may be particularly subject to cog-
nitive dissonance in the acquisition context, at least in some cases con-
Jl.ating their own preference.s that the target be sold to one bidder 
50 The Delawa re Supreme Court was particularly conce rned abou t th is in Paranwum, sta ting 
tha t " [b]ecause the Stock Option Agreement was not 'capped' to limit its max imum doll ar value, 
it had the potential to reach (and in this case did reach) unreasonable levels." Pa ram ount Com-
munications, lnc. v. QVC Network , Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. 1994). 
5 1 For a good overview of corporate auctions and the implicati ons of different auction strate-
gi es, see Macey, supra note 35. 
52 An expectancy-based lockup, for instance, would give the bidde r an amount equal to the 
diffe rence bet ween its bid and its reservation price; Fraidin an d Hanson's differing expectati ons 
and risk aversion rationales both appear to use expectancy as a floor. 
53 lf the ta rget is listed on the New York Stock E xchange, for instance, the issuance of 20% 
of its stock would requi re a sharehold.~ r vote, thus undennining much of th e purpose of the 
lockup. 
54 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAnd rews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 
1986) (referring to Bergerac's "strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman "). 
55 See, e.g., Susan Anti ll a, Hard Lessons of Paramount's Saga, N.Y. TI!VIES, Dec. 26, 1993, at 
Fll (noting that it is we ll-known that Martin Davis "hates Barry Diller") . 
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rather than others with the best interests of their shareholders.56 
Managers may overestimate the attractiveness of other aspects of the 
bidder 's offer c::· tlnderestimate t.he lil<elil1ood or nolentia1 val11e of a 
comnetim~ offer. 57 Together, valuation difficulties ~nd the existence of 
L ~ -
implicit preferences create a nontrivial nossibilitv that lo'y· al ~na "'1 'loerc - .1 J ..l.. .\. - · - - ).__t .1_ <.... • . t;) . >....) 
will make cost ly mistakes in granting lockups.ss 
2. (~~o llus ior/ .t1etYv'ee?t Tar1ge.t anli a .Bid.tt.:~r. - I I l a.clditic:'fl VJ ffl is -
take, another excer~tiG fl t 1) parties' general ter1 cie ~ncy to pr(rvid_e for 
. ., ' • 1 " . ' d J . . l . appropnate, ra tru:o;r tnan excess1ve 11qmaate , uamages, IS coLuswn 
anQJ r·olt")tPri !~ ' r•y.--...r.~-. ; ·¥ r; ~o- ,c,r- l ~ drt, -.1 -:r'\~ , v l a ~'~ 0•-' " ~-"' LJ..ti.\5 1 •~d. <'. ..._, , ·y 11:J. 
The ~.Jer(>::l:;ti cJ tt that target managers are Lli1li1zely t•:J eD.ter ii1tO an 
l·n~nD· l·~o T·: ·l·>::-o 1' ·" i ]of"· c'\Cife e <nf' ni implicitly :::l''·~ l]IY>("<; ·L>J} " "l' 'L-!J· p '""' ··· i ·l·P•' L-LIJ l'-' } . .... ~ -·....- -1. ··r' b _,- _, - ~ ... . ~W ul..- - ~-"- -'-- ""''-- ~ . ct .l~ ··- l_;o~l -.. . .,., .._"'! 
ha~~ e({ual bargaining povver. Economists have shown that parties 
may deviate from this norm, however, if one h~lS market cower vis-a-
vis the other.59 In this view, a monopolist may insist ~n excessive 
damages in order to exclude competi tors. The promisor may agree to 
56 Such d issonance seems most like ly to come into play when the re is oniy one bidde r and 
th e ta rge t 's managers discou nt the possi bili ty tha t o thers will emerge, o r-as very freq uent ly is 
the case-when it is unciear which of two o r mo re bidders is the highest valuing bid de r. Targe t 
managers cannot so easily justi fy a preference if the preferred bidder clea rl y is not the highest 
valuing bidde r. 
57 1l1e famous Globe Woolen case may we ll have been an example of such a dynamic. G lobe 
Woolen Co. '! . Utica Gas & E lec. Co., 121 N. E. 378 (N. Y. 1918). In Globe Woolen , Maynard , 
who was a d irecto r of both G lobe Woolen and U tica G as and E iectricity, an d the largest s tock-
holder o f Globe Woolen , agreed at the urging of a Utica office r to conside r converting G lobe 
Woolen 's mi lls to e lectrici ty . But Maynard m ade clear that he would only be in te rested if U tica 
guaran teed th at lhe switch would reduce G lobe Woolen 's energy costs. The contract tha t the 
Utica em ployee devised and the part ies agreed to turned out to give Globe Woolen an enom1o us 
wind fa!i , and was sin.:ck down by Judge Ca rdozo as viola ting l'VIayna rc! 's duty o f loyalty to Ut ica. 
Whi le no ev idence sugges ts tha t Jl/ fa ynard was invol ved in drafti ng the p r,; posed cont ract , o r that 
the Utica employee in t?nt ionclly fa vored G lobe Woolen, one suspe cts that the em ploye e 's su b-
conscious desire to make th e arrangement work fo r Globe Woolen-due to Ma ynard's status as 
on e o f his employe r's (U tica's) directo rs-increased th e likelih ood of a misca lculation such as 
the one tha t in fac t occur red. 
58 In th e analogous context of liquidated damages, commentato rs have suggested tha t prom -
isees have a disincentive tc seek supra-compensatory dam ages because th ey will have to pay for 
the extra compensatio n, pe rhaps in the form of a higher bid. A lan Schwa rtz, The i\dyth thm 
Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory R emedies: A n Analysis of Co.vztracting fo r Contract Dam-
ages , 100 YALE L.J . 369 (1990) . Notice that a bidder's general d is inci ination to pay for excessive 
re lie f m ight reduce, bu t woul d no t el iminate, the possibi lity of mistake. Moreove r, any such 
disinclination seems li ke ly to be panicul arly m uted in the corporate acq uisition context, espe -
cially if the ta rget manage rs' preferences cause them to attach little vaiue to th e possibil ity of 
o ther, higher bids . 
59 Tne cl ass ic article is Phillipe A ghion & Patrick Bolton , Contraas as a Barrier to Erury, 77 
AM. EcoN. REv. 388 (1987). Aghion and Bolton 's insights have recently beeT! applied to the 
contractu al li qui dated damages and antit rust contexts. Joseph F. Brod!ey & Ching-to A . Ma, 
Conrracr Pena!iies, !'vlonopoiizing Strategic, and Amitrusl Policy, 45 STA !--1 . L. REv. 1161 (1993); 
Tai-Yeong Chung, On the Socia! Optirnality of Liquidated Damages Clauses: A n Economic A nal-
ysis , 8 J. L. EcoN. & 0RG. 280 (1992). 
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such a provision so that it will receive some of the rents obtained from 
a third partv that attemots to enter the market.60 
• l 
Thus, in the corporate acquisition context, a bidder who has mar-
ket power may demand a lockup that excludes all other bidders except 
those that not only can outbid the iockup bidder in absolute terms, but 
also can shoulder the cost of the excessive damages triggered if they 
win the bidding. It is not clear how frequently bidders are likely to 
have market power superior to that of a target. Yet many, and per-
haps most , observers do not view the market for corporate control as 
a competitive market ,61 and a bidder may often have significant lever-
age if the target's managers are concerned that another, more hostil e 
bidder could emerge. 
Fraidin and H anson acknowledge that bidders and targets may 
enter into collusive lockups, but characterize this as a potential benefit 
of lockups rather than as a problem. A simple hypothetical illustrates 
their reasoning. Assume that the initial bidder, Bl ,62 values the target 
at $75; another bidder, B3, values it at $100; and the target's managers 
would be willing to sell it for $70 or more. Rather than auction the 
target, both the bidder and the target may benefit if they enter an 
agreement pursuant to which Bl bids $85 and target agrees to a $14 
lockup.63 Absent the lockup, B3 would have won the auction by 
agreeing to p<:y $75 for bidder. The lockup forces B3 to raise its bid to 
$86 (or, more precisely, to an amount greater than $85), which to-
gether with the $14 B3 must pay to Bl equals B3's full reservation 
price, and enables Bl and the target to secure most or all of B3's prof-
its for themselves.64 
This account suggests that collusive damages not only may accord 
with allocative efficiency (since the bidder that values the target most, 
B3, will win the bidding), but they may also be value increasing for 
target 's shareholders. The problern with the account is that it seems to 
60 The collusion analysis depends on an assumption that a third-party entrant is likely to 
have market power-that is, that there will be on ly one entrant, rather than, competing ent rants. 
See, e.g., Bradley & Ma, supra note 59, at 1173. This very frequ ently is the case in the corporate 
acquisition context, as suggested by the discussion of the nature of the corporate control market 
below. 
61 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock , Antitrust and the Markel for Corporme Com rol, 77 CAL L. 
REv. 1365, 1379 (1989). Fraid in and Hanson th emselves note this in another context. Fraidin & 
Hanson, supra note 9, at 1813 n.284. 
62 Following Fraidin and Hanson's notation (which they in tum borrow from Ayres, supra 
note 8), I use Bl to indicate the initial bidder (and recipient of the lockup) and B3 to refer to th e 
new, higher valuing bidder. 
63 Notice that, while BZ's $85 bid exceeds its rese rva tion price , Bl does not expect to pay thi s 
amount because it anticipates that B3 will win the bidding. Some of the problems with this 
analysis are discussed below. 
64 Thus, the target would receive a $16 profit ($86-$70), and Bl would receive the $14 value 
of its lockup. Absent the lockup, B3 would only need to bid $75 (or slightly more) to win the 
bidding, thus giving the target a profit of $5 ($75-$70) and leavi ng Bl with nothing. 
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assume that Bl and target have equal bargaining power and that both 
know exactly what B3's reservation price for target is. The parties' 
ability to ascertain B3's resen;ation pric.:; is limited if B3 has actively 
participated in the bidding process, and next to none if the target and 
Bl agree to a lockup before any other biddeL have entered the bid-
ding. Moreover, if Bl has superior bargaining power, or if the parties 
. B..,, l . r ' ' ' . . ld f rmsgauge , .J s va uatwn 01 tne target, trro; 1 C>c~cxp may y1e_ ar more 
1 · -:r..c c · . 1 • , m-,,..,. 1 • • rnangnant consequences. 11, i.or ms1:an.ce, mos J>; u a no 1s g1ven a 
lockup worth $35, allocative efficiency could be i:hwartcd, since B3 
may never enter the bidding, and target's shareholders could fare 
worse than they '·Nould in a simple auction.55 S1_1 c'n a re:mlt seems at 
least as likely to occur as th~ rcsy sc~i1ario Fraidin and Hanson 
depict. 66 
In sum, Fraidin and Hanson's assumption that loyal managers will 
never grant excessive lockups is simply an assumption. The likelihood 
of mistakes and collusion makes clear that malignant lockups are a 
very real concern. The most obvious consequence of such lockups is 
that they may cause a target to be sold to a lower valuing, rather than 
the highest valuing, bidder. Given that lockups enhance target man-
agers' ability to control whether a particular bidder acquires the tar-
get, excessive lockups also can have perverse effects outside of the 
bidding process.67 Because potential bidders fear that the target will 
grant a lockup to a favored bidder, and thus thwart any unsolicited 
offer, lockups can reduce bidders' incentive to engage in a search.68 In 
addition, target managers ' ability to use lockups as leverage in negoti-
ating continued employment or attractive severance packages could 
- ------------------- ________ , ______________ _ 
65 8 1's bid of $70 gives ta iget shareholders :];5 less than th e $75 they would receive in a 
simple auction. The lock up thus acts like a specific perfon:'1ance provision. This presumably is 
at le ast part of what Viacom had in mind when it announced, in a much-quoted statement, that 
only a " nuclear attack" could prevent its acquisit ion of Paramount from going through . Para-
mo unt Communications, Inc. v. QVC Newtwork, inc., 637 A .2d 34, 39 (De l. 1994). Notice that 
an asset lockup is particularly likely to entail what, in effect, is specific perfonnance, although 
the parties run the risk that a lockup involving the ta rget's key assets will be seen as a sale of 
most or all of its assets, thus requi1ing a shareholder vote . See, e.g., DEL CoDE. ANN. tit. 8, § 271 
(Supp. 1995). 
Fraidin and Hanson's response to th is is to suggest th at Bl will resell the target to 83, which 
would make both bette r off and assure that the target ultimately winds up in the hands of the 
highest valuing bidder, 83 . I describe some of the impediments to this scenario in Part III, infra. 
66 The collusion problem is particularly acu te if Bl and the ta rget do not kn ow whether BJ-
t hat is , a higher valuing third party-exists at the time they agiee to an acquisition and locku p, 
since uncerta in ty about 83 magnifies the likeli hood that Bl can secure a lockup that precludes 
entry by another bidder. See Brodley & Ma, supra note 59. 
67 The concerns discussed below can arise even with an otherwise appropiiate lockup. They 
obviously are exacerba ted if the target 's managers grant an excessive lockup. 
68 Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner discuss this concern in detail in a forthcoming article. 
See Kahan & Klausn er, supra note 10. 
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diminish the ex ante disciplining effect the takeover market has on 
managers. 69 
Lockups also offer significant benefits, as \Ne ha ve seen. But the 
perverse effects they can have suggest that courts have every reason to 
be concerned that target managers not en ter into malignant lockup 
arrangemen ts . 
III. TH E iMP OSSIBILIT Y OF F ORE CLOSI NG HI G H E R BIDD E RS ? 
\Vhile Fraidin and H anson might quibble '.vi th the paniculars of 
the preceding analysis, they appear to ad:.nowledge the possibility of 
excessive lockups. Their response is to sugges t that there is nothing to 
worry about, and that the concerns noted in the preceding analysis are 
mistaken. In what arguably is the pivotal contention in their a rticle, 
Fraidin and Hanson insist that even an excessive lockup will n ot fore-
close a higher bidder from acquiring the target and, as a result , that it 
does not make a difference whether a target 's managers sometimes 
grant inappropriately generous damages.7° 
Simply put, they argue that as long as Bl 's bid plus the amount of 
the lockup is less than BJ's reservation price, 83 will win the bidding 
in the first instance; moreover, even if an excessive, supra-expectancy 
lockup stymies B3 initially, thus enabling Bl to acquire the target, B3 
will simply arrange to purchase the target from Bl at some price 
higher than Bl 's reservation price but lower than B3's. Thus, even if 
the lockup is great enough to thwart a higher valuing bidder initially, 
it will not prevent such a bidder from ultimately acquiring the target. 
In short , lockups will not interfere with all ocative effic iency. 
Despite its surface appeal, the suggestion that lower valuing b id-
ders will always resell targets to higher bidders, and in doing so 
counteract the effects of excessive lockuos, ·proves m oblem atic on in-
, l 
spection. ~The subparts that follow consider the two most obvious im-
oediments to this scenario.71 
l 
69 !d. Tl1e de triment al effe ct on managerial discipline should not be ove rsta ted . Even if the 
m anagers of a target a re able to retain their jobs, they are likely to be subj ect to enhanced 
overs ight after a takeove r. Moreove r, because ta keove r defenses a lready give ta rget m anage rs a 
significant say in whether the target is or is not tak en over, as we ll as significant leverage in 
bargaining with a bidde r, lockups m ay have onl y a margin al additi onal effect. 
70 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1788-89. As the illustration below suggests, any lock up 
that gives a bidder more than its expectancy interest can have the forecl osing effect described in 
this Part. For a more detailed discussion of this point and its implications, see infra no te 83. 
71 In addition to the problems with re sale as a means of counteracting excessive lockups tha t 
I discuss be low, full enforcement of excessive lockups may dimin ish the parti es' incentive to 
ren egotiate inappropria te lockup provisions. Thi s conce rn is discussed ir, great er deta il in Pa rt 
IV . 
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A . The Costs of Resale 
._.. } " • .. :1 J , ' ' _La tr1e rnllcn-cltea aeoate aoo11t managers respons:~ tc' ta.keO\'er 
effo rts, Ronald Gilson suggested that resale by an initial bidder afte r it 
acq< tired a target could entail substantial costs.72 G ilson's reasoning 
was that once a bidder and target merge, any subsequent bidder (B3) 
now r:;ust value the combined entity. A .. s a result, any previous inves-
\iga tion of the tmget is largely useless , and B3 rnust reinves tigate in 
mder w 2,ccount for the effects of >.h e initial bidder-target combina-
ti.on. /\_t its heart, G ilson's analysis was an argument about the likeli-
hood of Coasian bargaining in the corporate acquisition context. In 
his view, significant transaction costs would impede the multiple trans· 
acri:::ms necessary to move a target to the bi"der that values it most. 
Fraidin and H anson point out in response that, by reselling the 
target before it and the target have merged ("preselling" the target), 
the initial bidder (Bl) can minimize the need for the duplicative inves-
tigation that Gilson was concerned about. Yet even a presale of this 
sort would fa ll far short of eliminating the costs of an additional sale. 
Moreover, presales obviously would not take place on every occasion 
when a higher valuing bidder (B3) existed, particularly if Bl were un-
aware of B3's existence. In short, resales and even presales would 
entail significant costs that would potentially thwart the second sale 
on which Fraidin and Hanson's analysis depends in some, and perhaps 
many, cases. 
What are these costs? First, even if B3 already had evaluated and 
bid on the target, and Bl and the target had not yet combined (thus 
obviating G ilson 's "reinventing the wheel" concern), both it and Bl 
still v.;ould face additional investigation and other costs in connection 
'Nith the second sale . If B3 had dropped out of the original bidding 
72 Rona ld J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offe r Defense , 
35 STA>J . L REv. 51 , 63 (1982); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk , The Case for Facilitating Comp e1ing 
Tende r Offers, 95 HARV. L R Ev. 1028 (1994); Lucian A . Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating 
Compering Tender Offers: A Reply and Exrension , 35 STAN. L REv. 23 (1982) [hereinafter, A 
Reply and Extension] . The debate grew out of E asterbrook and Fisch el's " passivity" thesis that a 
ta rget 's managers should never defend against takeover effo rts, and centered on Easterbrook 
and Fischel 's exchanges with Gilson and Bebchuk. Frank H. E as terbrook & D anie l R. Fischei , 
The Proper Role of a Target 's Management in Responding ro a Tender Offer , 94 HARV. L REv. 
1161 (1981) ; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, A ucrions and Sunk Cosrs in 
Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L REv. 1 (1982). Alan Schwartz subsequently weighed in with Easter-
brook and Fische l, and against the auction regime fa vored by G ilson and Bebchuk. A lan 
Schwartz, Search Th eory and rhe Tender Offer A uction , 2 J.L EcoN. & 0RG. 229 (1986). The 
question wh ether resale would ensure allocative efficiency if courts enforced a ll lockups parallels 
this debate in many respects, Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 790-94 , though with some 
interesting differences. Unlike passivity, full enforcement could undermine, as well as enhance, 
search, as discussed earlier. 
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early m 1, the nec-~ss ary investigation could be substantial;73 B3's ex-· 
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l nl tla1 oKaer, iJ, J, c12·; agreea ,_ o p urc1 ase Large t !.or :o i t anei nas oeen 
given a $35 loctup, and that B3 values target at $100. While Bl has an 
incentive to sell targ·et to B3 for some amount between $75 and $100, 
and B3 has an incentive to buy, as in any negotiating process, uncer·· 
tainty about one another 's bargaining range or other factors may pre-
vent them from reaching agreement.76 More than in many contex ts , in 
corporate acquisitions, personality conflicts and target directors ' rec-
ognition that they may lose their positions as a result of the takeover 
magnify these frictions , and can play a large role in whether a deal 
actually goes through.77 If an initial contest between Bl and B3 to 
purchase target v;as acrimonious, such frictions might prevent resale 
negotiations from ever getting off the ground.78 
73 Notice that, if the lockup led to an early conclusion of the initi al sale , an y costs saved as a 
res ult of B3's eariy exit wo uld need to be subt racted from the costs incurred in the second sa le in 
order to determ ine the net costs of the extra sale. 
7 4 See, e.g., Bebchuk , Faci!ira cing Cotnpeting Tender Offers , supra note 12 , at 1048; Bebc hul<, 
A Reply and Extension, supra note 72, a t 41. T he risk th at a higher valuing bidder exists but 
wo uld never be loca ted is no t a trivial one. A lthough the initia l bidder theo re tica ll y has an 
incen tive to se<: rch for such a bidder, as a p ractical matter many bidders are primarily in te rested 
in acquic-ing the ta rget, as noted below. See infra note 79 and accompan ying tex t. Un less an 
obviousl y higher va luing bidder is readi ly at hand , the initi al bidder may not se rio usly loo k fo r a 
sale , at least in the neu te rm. 
75 I use th e term "st rategic bargaining fricti ons" in an effort to make clear that the concerns 
add ressed in the text tha t foliows are a specific type of "friction" or transaction cost. 
76 The extensive lite rature on overcoming such fricti ons attests to their pe rvasiveness . See, 
e.g., RoGER f iSHER & W ILLIAlvl URY, GEITING TO YEs: NEGOTIATfNG A GR EEMENT W rTHOUT 
G IVING IN (1 981); Jennifer G erarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales fo r Mediation, 80 
VP. . L REv. 323, 333 (1994). 
77 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text fo r anecdotal examples. 
78 While Fraidin and Hanson allude to such costs, they dismiss them in a footnote , based on 
their belief that "th·o t ransactions costs of resa le and pre-sale are no highe r th an those between 
the recipient bidder and the target board. " Fraidin & Hanson , supra note 9, a t 1303 n.239. Bu t 
this does not follow from their analysis. The comparison is not between the strategic ba rgaining 
fr ictions of a targe t-Bl sa.! e and those of the sale by Bl to B3. R ath er than substituting one sale 
for the othe r, resale adds a second sale. R esale the refore entails two sets of bargain ing frictions 
rathe r than just one . Moreover, even if Fraidin and Hanson we re correct to compare the two 
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A consideration of the reasons the managers of bidders engage in 
takeovers underscores the obstacles to resale. Observers have long 
suggested , and recent studies confirm, that hubris is often :::m !rri.pcr-
tant motivating factor in a bidder's decision to engage in acqu isition 
activity.79 Even in the absence of an "empire building" m otiVi:-1 l:i(iTL, 
bidders who have strategic reasons for acquiring a targe t often h::rve 
not pursued the acquisition with resale in mind. In both insta:n:.::es, 2. 
successful initia l bidder may have little interest in considerin,g a. r·s s:=t!·':  
to B3. Moreover, the literature on the gaps betvveen offer anc :::,=;}: i :ng 
prices suggests that the price at which Bl would consider a r esa ii;:: rn2.y 
rise considerably once it has acq uired the target.80 
Tax effects are sti ll another source of potential impedirn.em::;. ln 
. . R" ld . . . . c ' an auction re:nme, _j.J cou1 structure ns acqms1t1on or tne t:.:. rg e: t ;:c:S a 
~ -~ 
tax-free reorgan ization in many cases. 81 By contrast, the resale m ech-
anism could undermine B3's ability to structure the acquisition a.s tax-
free. If the in itial sale of the target to Bl were taxable, for instanc,o;, 
this sale might preclude B3 from characterizing its subsequent 
purchase of the target from Bl as tax-free, thus adding a poten tially 
huge transaction cost-an expense that could scotch the dea l from 
B3's perspective and, as a result, prevent the highest bidder fron1 ac-
quiring the target. 82 
sets of costs, the second (81-83) sale might often involve more significant st rategic bargaining 
friction s than a sale of target to Bl or an auction involving Bl and B3. Not only do es target 
managers' willingness to grant a lockup to Bl suggest that target-Bl strategic bargaining frict ions 
may be comparatively low, but Bl and 83 will often be competitors, thus m agnifying the likeli-
hood of such fr ictions. If such frictions are absent, on the other hand, and the resale process 
between 81 and B3 is too smooth (and even if it is not), it might even raise antit rust conce rns. 
Fo r an arg ument tha t bidders who decide to negotiate jointly should be subject to antit rust scm-
tiny, see Rock , supra note 61. 
79 See, e.g. , Ma thew LA. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining Premiums Paid fo r 
La rge Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris (July 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on fi le with 
the Northwesrern Univ ersity Law Review ) (four key characteristics of manage rs most like ly to 
engage in short-term acq uisiti on activity we re inexperience in the industry, good performance in 
recent months, self-esteem, and recent, glowing press coverage); see also Richard R oll , Th e 
Hubris Hyporhesis of Corporare Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986) 
80 The offer/asking price gap refers to the tendency of current owners of property to piace a 
high er value on the property than do potential buyers. The existence of such a gap is an impo r-
tant impediment to Coasian bargaining. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 12. 
81 A bidder genera lly can trear an acquisition as tax-free if a significant portion of !he 
purchase price consists of th e bidder's stock. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 368(a) (1988) (defining 
"reorganization"); id. §§ 354 -68 (providing for tax-free treatment of reorganizations whe re there 
is a continuity of interest of the new and old security holders). 
82 1l1e problem is that the initial taxable purchase could be seen as e liminating the cont inuity 
of interest between 83 and the hold ers of the target's stock . In the recent, widely fo llowed 
decision in J.E. Seagram Corp. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 75 (1995), which involved the competing 
tender offers by Seagram and DuPont for Conoco, the Tax Court held that Seagram's purchase 
of a su bstantia l minority of Conoco's shares through its unsuccessful tender offer did not des troy 
the tax-free nature of DuPont's successful cash-and-stock tender. Had Seagram actuaiiy ac-
quired Conoco, then sold its shares to DuPont in a sale-resale transaction, DuPont would have 
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TI1is is not w say that the resales envisioned by Fraidi.n and Ban-
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would regularly take place-that :3. higher valuing bidder would al-
ways end up acqEiring the target. 83 As suggested by our discussion of 
the direct and indirect costs of an additional transaction, however, 
their belief in flawless private ordering is implau~.ible. Lockups could 
a11d v~O Lllcl {J re-~Jen t th·~~ rarget frorn -~virl(iirlg 1.rp in tl1e hands of tl1e 
highest va luing bidder in sorne cases. h'foreover, even if transaction 
costs do not interfere \Vith a desirable second sa.le, the expense of re-
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ship of a target. 
B. Process Concerns with a Full Enforcement Regime 
In addition to serving as liquidated damages, lockup provisions 
can (as noted earlier) act very much like a specific performance provi-
sion. Once the managers of a target grant an excessive lockup to an 
initial bidder, they may effectively preclude the target from selling it-
self to any other bidder. Notice that resale or presale by the initial 
. bidder to a higher valuing bidder does not change this. vVhile a sec-
ond sale may transfer the target to a higher valuing bidder, the target 
has already been sold to the initial bidder vvhen this occurs. 
Even if one is not concerned about lockups that are both exces-
sive and foreclosing from the perspective of allocative efficiency, these 
lockups are deeply problematic from a corporate decision-making 
perspective.84 In the corporate acquisition context, the role of a tar-
had much more difficulty characterizing its acquisition as tax-free . Moreover, the Tax Court 
made clear that any evidence that the two bidders were acting in concert (as would often be 
present in the presale context in particular) would be-: likely to desuoy the requisite continuity of 
interest where the initial transaction is taxable. The mere possibility of a dispute about the tax 
treatment of a sale-resale transaction would be a significant deterrent to its consummation. My 
thanks to Alice Abreu for her insights into these tax issues. 
83 See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1804 ("foreclosure is unlikely ever to occur"). 
84 Any lockup that assures a bidder more than its expectancy interest can foreclose higher 
bidders, as Ayres (speaking in terms of "full insurance") pointed out. Ayres, supra note 8. 
Although Fraidin and Hanson argue that thee parties might appropriately enter into supra-expec-
tancy lockups in some circumstances, the need for such relief is questionable, as discussed earlier 
in subpart i.B (differing expectations and risk a.version), and elaborated on below in arguing for 
a reliance-based standard. See Part IV. Supra-expectancy lockups therefore seem much more 
likely to reflect mistake or collusion than more benign origins, and I will assume that this is the 
case in the discussion that follows. fvioreover, the process problems l describe raise questions 
even about an otherwise benign, supra-expectancy lockup. 
One further point warrants mention . Even an expectancy-based lockup may foreclose other 
bidders and thus might also seem to raise process concerns in some contexts. The only bidders 
that such a lockup would always foreclose are !ower vaiuing bidders, ho wever, and in conse-
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get's managers IS to propose a merger or other transaction to target 
shareholders ,85 and to put the final decision to a shareholder vote.s6 
The problem with a foreclosing, supra-expectancy lockup is that it 
makes the target's directors , rather than its shareholders, the final 
decisionmaker as to the sale to the initial bidder. Once the sale has 
been "locked up" with such a lockup, it is effectively a done deal, long 
before shareholders have the onportunitv to resoond. 
_L - .J !. 
Fraidin and H anson do not address this concern, but re lated 
questions have surfaced in several import ant non-D elaware decisions 
that purport to apply Dela-..vare law. 87 The most prominent of these 
cases have focused on agreements by a target board not to entertain 
any bids other than that of the in iti al bidder--so-called "exclusivitv" 
- .I 
provisions. Courts generally have been hostile to these provisions. 
While the Ninth Circuit indicated a ·willingness to enforce an exclusiv-
ity provision/'8 two state supreme courts have refused to hold direc-
tors to "best efforts" clauses after changed circumstances made the 
merger in question less attractive.89 
These exclusivity provisions arguably do not really interfere with 
intracorporate decisionmaking, at least in the absence of duty of loy-
alty problems. This is because , from an ex ante perspective, directors 
may be acting wholly consistently with their fi duciary duties when 
they agree to a best efforts provision-only when circumstances 
change does 20/20 hindsight cast doubt on the decision. Similarly, the 
provisions affect, but arguably do not seriously undermine, share-
hoider voting: shareholders can reject the proposal if a new suitor 
emerges, and thus pave the way for a subsequent tender offer or 
merger proposal from the new suitor.90 
qu ence, this seems less problematic. Any resid ual concern would almost completely disappear 
unde r the reliance model proposed in the next Part . 
85 See, e.g., DEL CoDE A I'.'N. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp. 1995) (req uiring directo r resoluti on as pre-
req ui site to merger) . 
86 !d. 
87 See Jewel Co. , Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Great Western Producers Coop. v. Great Western United Co rp., 613 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980); 
ConAgra , Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1986) . A lthough the exten t to which these 
cases actu ally reflect Delaware law is debatable, the Delaware Suprem e Co urt quoted ConAgra 
with approval in Paramount. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 
34. 51 (Del. 1994). 
88 Jewel Co .. 741 F.2d 1555. 
89 Grear Western Producers , 613 P.2d 873; ConAgra , 382 N.W.2d 576. Moreove r, commenta-
tors quickly criticized the Ninth Circuit's decision in Jewel Co. , 741 F.2d 1555. See, e.g., Richard 
M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CAL L. REv. 1671, 
1698-1709 (1985) . As the anal ysis below sugges ts, my own view is that such provisions are defen-
sible, at least absent other problems. 
90 While affirmative promotion of a merger the boa rd knows to be infe rior seems problem-
atic from a fiduciary duty perspective, a boa rd's promise not to acti ve ly seek addition al offers 
and to at least put the existing offer to a shareho lder vote arguably should be enforced. Share-
holders still may fear that their managers will fa il to negotiate with a new bidder after the initial 
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The same cannot be said of a supra-expectancy lockup, however. 
Far more th::m exclusivity provisions, such a lockup may effec tively 
foreclose ali other options .91 In theory, shareholders still can vote 
clown the initial proposal, but any new suitor would be forced to make 
good on che stock lockup, an added expense that may eliminate its 
ability to top t l:.te initial bidder 's bid. Thus, if a targe t's board grants a 
supra-expect2ncy lockup, it may leave target shareholders with li ttle 
choice but to forego any takeover premium or to approve the initial 
proposal. 
/\t the least, this suggests that lawmakers should sharply curtail 
the allmvable duration of such lockups. If the lockup were strictly 
hrni j~ed in ·uration, shareholders' ability to rej ect th e exis ting propo-
sal in the hope of a subsequent, better offer would not be nearly as 
s::rimisl'11 undermined. From the initial bidder's oersoective, of course, . ' 1 
this would take away much of an otherwise foreclosing lockup's at-
tractiveness. Nevertheless, it seems clear that some degree of judicial 
scrutiny of lockups is both necessary and inevitable, contrary to Frai-
din and Hanson's call for universal enforcement. 
IV. ALT ERNA T IVE APPROACHES TO CORPO R ATE LOCKUPS 
In assessing the existing literature on lockups, Fraidin and Han-
son contend that a lockup should never be invalidated unless it both is 
excessive and forecloses other possible bidders. In their view, no 
lockup will meet this standard of malignancy. The authors therefore 
conclude, paraphrasing Delaware's Chancellor Allen, that since "lock-
ups, like chicken soup, can' t hurt but may well help,"92 courts should 
always enforce them. 
Th.e problem with their otherwise well- reasoned analysis is that 
Iod.ups d early can "hurt. " As we have seen, even loyal boards will 
sometimes grant excess ive lockups, and such lockups may thwart sales 
to higher valuing bidders. Because full enforcement falls far short of 
The perfection that Fraidin and Hanson attribute to it, we mus t com-
pare it to other plausible approaches. I take up this task in the sub-
parts that follow and, in doing so, propose a reliance damages 
approach to judicial scrutiny of lockups. 
proposal has been voted down. But fiduciary duty constraints, together with th e ne w bidde r's 
ability to make a tender offer directly to the shareholders, reduce the extent of this problem. 
91 See Buxbaum, supra note 89, at 1706. For a similar point about fiduci a ry duti es in the 
t:okeover context, see Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: Th e Delaware Supreme Court's 
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 l CoRP. L. 583, 596-97 (1994) . Kahan argues that the inability of 
Rev lon 's sho.reholders to reverse th e merger agreement between Forstm ann and Revlon if th ey 
wished to do so , due to defensive measures such as the lockup used in th at case, was an impor-
tan t facto r in the Delaware 's Supreme Court 's decision to apply enhanced scrutiny in R evlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (DeL 1986). 
92 Fraidin & Hanson , supra note 9, at 1745. 
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A. Invalidating All Lockups 
Given the shortcomings of a blanket enforcement regime, one al-
ternative would be to move in precisely the opposite direction--to 
invalidate all lockup arrangements.93 Like full enforcement, universal 
invalidation would obviate the need for judicial assessment of which 
lockups are and are not appropriate. This approach also would elirni-
nate the risk of malignant lockups and other problems. 
The obvious downside to inva lidation is that it sacrifices all of the 
~:; encfits of lockups-their usefulness in compensating a bidder fo r its 
costs, fo r instance, and for en ticing a reluctant bidder to oanicioate in 
~ ' 1 
an auction. In light of these benefits, blanket invalidation seems rela-
tively unattractive unl ess v;e conclude that lockup arrangements are 
routinely malignant Nevert heless , this clearly is a plausible approach. 
It also avoids the kinds of process problems posed by a full enforce-
ment regime. 
B. A Reliance Damages Model of Judicial Scrutiny 
The more obvious choice is a model between the extremes of in-
validating all lockups and Fraidin and Hanson's full enforcement re-
gime. This subpart describes a model for court differentiation and 
argues that, while it too has shortcomings, the model is at least as 
attractive normatively and is far more plausible positively than blan-
ket enforcement. While previous commentators also have called for 
varying kinds of judicial scrutiny,94 this model, my reliance damages 
model, differs in several crucial respects. Most importantly, based on 
the analogy between lockup provisions and contract damages gener-
ally, I question the frequent use of expectancy-based assumptions 
about lockups, after firs t making a case that courts should scrutinize 
lockups at least to the extent of striking down those that promise a 
bidder more than its expectancy interest. 
1. Lockups as Liquidated Damages Provisions. - 1n American 
contracts law, judicial scrutiny rather than universal enforcement of 
liquidated damages provisions has long been the norm. In assessing a 
provision that stipulates damages, courts consider whether it appropri-
93 Despite the hosti lity towards lock ups shown by the Delaware Supreme Cou rt in Para-
moum, the cou rt has always insisted th at lockups are not per se invalid . Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. QVC Ne twork , Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994) ; Rev/on, 506 A.2d at 183. 
De laware has, in fact, upheld substantial lockups, alth ough usually after an auct ion or in cases 
whe re no competing bidder has emerged. See, e.g. , Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1765- 66; 
see also Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, In c., No. C IY.A. 9536, CIV.A. 956 1, 1988 WL 8772 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 8, 1988) (16.6 % plus bidding expenses); Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., No. CIY.A. 
8486, 1936 WL 5840 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1986) (21.7% of value of the target) . Universal in va lida-
tion wou ld therefore mean a substanti al change in existing law. 
94 See supra no te 8. 
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ately compensates a nonbreaching party for her expectation damage:3, 
striking down the provision if it operates as a penalty- i.e., if it gives 
the nonbreaching pany a greater profi t than she vvould have rece[\·e,j 
if the contract had been performed.95 Courts do not require that a 
liquidated damages provision correlate perfectly with actual expecta-
tion damages. Instead , they tend to focus on whether the pro visio r~ 
;,vas a reasonable prediction of a promisee's likely damages in the 
event of 2 breach , and whether the actual amount of damages V! <::s 
·~ 
uncerta inY6 
A lthough some contracts commentators have insisted that court~: 
should routine ly enforce all liquidated damages clauses,97 much as 
Fraidin and Hanson argue for blanket enforcement of lockups, cou:;-t; ' 
hostili ty to supra-expectancy damages provisions can be persuasively 
justified on efficiency grounds. By invalidating supra-expectancy liq-
uidated damages provisions, courts can minimize the incentive prom-
isees o therwise would have to strategically induce a breach to take 
advantage of an excessive damages provision.98 A n excessive dam-
ages provision may also be evidence of mistake or implicit collusion 
between the parties.99 Given that lockups are closely analogous to 
liquidated damages provisions, this reasoning also serves as a pmver-
ful argument for judicial scru tiny of lockup arrangements.100 
95 See, e.g. , Samuel A . R ea , J r. , Effi ciency Implications of Penalties and Liquida:ed Damages, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 147-48 (1984). Othe r important articl es in th e lite ra tu re on liquida te d 
dam ages incl ude Kenne th W. Clarkson et al. , Liquidated Dam ages v. Penalties: Sense or ,Von· 
sense?, 1978 Wis. L. R Ev . 351; Charles J. Goetz & R obe rt E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penal-
ties and the Jusr Compensation Principle: Som e Notes on an Enfo rcem ent i'v!odel and a The ory of 
Effici ent Breach, 77 Co w:vr. L. REv. 554 (1977) ; Schwa rtz, supra note 58; Eric L. Tall ey, 1-.lo te , 
Comract Renegoriarion, Mechanism Design, and 1he Liquidmed Damages Rule, 46 STAK L. Fi.Ev . 
11 95 (1994) [hereinafter Note, Contract Renegotiation]. 
96 R ea, supra note 95, a t 147-48. The U ni fo rm Comm ercia l Code and th e Second Resta te-
m ent adopt essen tially this stand ard. U .C.C. § 2-71 8(1) ; R ESTATEMENT (SECO'<D) OF C ON-
TRACTS § 356 ( 1981). However, neith er expressly limi ts a court's focus to t he rime of the 
contract, and some courts have required tha t liquidated damages be reasonable not onl y th e ;; 
but also at th e time of the breach. See, e.g., Vines v. O rchard Hills, Inc., 435 A .2d 1022 (Conn . 
1980) (focusing on reasonabl eness at breach ). A t least one commentator detects an increasing 
tendency by co urts to invalida te liquidated damages provisions that are unreasonable at the tim e 
of breach, even if they we re reasonable initiall y. Note, Conrract Renegoriation, sup ra note 95 , at 
1202-03. 
97 Schwartz, supra note 58. 
98 See Clarkson et al., supra note 95, at 366. 
99 See R ea , supra note 95 , at 160-63. R ea points out that nonenforcement in the event of a 
m istake "fo rces the party best able to acqui re informati on on losses, the buyer, to acquire m o re 
in form ation. " !d. at 162. 
100 Eric Talley has rece ntly suggested , as an addit ional reason fo r judicial scrutin y of excessive 
liq uid ated dam ages provisions, that scrutiny may red uce the costs of ex post renegotiation of 
inappropriate provisi ons, even if uncert ainty undermin es the courts' ability to accu ra tely de te r-
m ine the nonbreaching party's actual damages. Note, Coruract Renegotiation, supra note 95 , a t 
1240- 41. For further disc ussion of this insight and its applicabili ty to corporate lock ups, see infm 
notes 106 & 127 and accompanying text. 
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To be sure , not all of the justifications for striking down supra-
expectancy liquidated damages provisions translate into the corporate 
1 "lT., -r- t o v+ TI !~ .;~., l~: e..::, { 1 07"1 ';- i ~s . ; , , -· A D V lo ~nh > ~ a . 10~.-. "Up CO>lv~"' '- · .... 1k- _, uQ :_.,_~ ._ • .f.,..,ln ·"' Lte ,s Uflv "".,amp '-'· ~ e conc~._., rn l ll 
the context of an ordinar'l contract is that a promisee \vho is vrotected 
' " 
by an overly generous dam ages provision will attempt to claim breach 
if the promisor devi21.!es from the contract in even trivial 1:vays .101 
1..f ..-..lr ~ f ) .-.1,_, 0 . .......,~,!-· .::::::,·,... ·:·; n ·,··. ,-1 ---r ·-~~ - · 'h:r ,... _. - }- ~,... ~ ,. r C • r 1 b- 1 ~- ~ , t~ ··· · r- ·-. _,_,Q,._ .,_Up _, , vn L.ll •v \..; .;L~ '. l •. •.u .t ..l , u. , _ _,_ f1 8.[L_ J ct l G lugg~..- 1 ed ' Y C! ! c,ffi 3. .!C, t::d..:·--
• • • 1 1 .r- ~ • l • 1 . . . ., 11v ascertama o1e e ':er~t::, E;-:~st o_;: 'N l1lcn are en trre v wrt hm t11 e orom--
J J ~ 
• ' I ' \ · ' 1 • ] • • ·• 1sor s (Jarget s; conU') :., sucn a3 a t2rget s aeclSlon to accept a secon.o 
dfer. 
The lockup agF::eme nt Paramoun t gave to Viacom, and which 
\Vas eventually struck do;,vn by the Delaware Supreme Court, illus-
tra tes this point. Pd l four of the events that would trigger Viacom 's 
lockup rights turned on Paramount 's en tering into a Business Combi-
nation or Com peeing 'I:ans2.ction (as defined in the merger agree-
ment) with another bidder. 102 Because each of these factors is in the 
target's (here, Paramount's) control , a lockup bidder such as Viacom 
could not easily induce breach. Moreover, "breach" is less pernicious 
with lockups since it ordinarily benefits bo th parties-the lockup bid-
der receives the value of the lockup and the target sells to a higher 
valuing bidder-rather than only the promisee (bidder); and the pos-
sibility that a higher bidder will emerge arguably is contemplated by 
the parties and courts. 1 03 
Despite such distinctions, the case for scrutinizing lockups is at 
least as compelling as it is for other liquidated damages provisions. As 
we have seen, and as happens with liquidated damages provisions , 
mistake, collusion, or other problems may cause the parties to agree 
to an excessive lockup. While Fraidin and Hanson contend that there 
is no reason to ·worry about even those lockups that foreclose other, 
higher valuing bidders, since a lockup bidder can simply resell to a 
higher valuing bidder and thus ensure allocative efficiency, judicial 
scrutiny offers several advantages over their sale-resale scenario. 
101 See, e.g., Clarkson et a!. , supra note 95, at 366; see also Lake River Co rp. v. Ca rborundum 
Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985) (d icta not ing the inducement concern). 
102 See Stock Option A greement Between Viacom, Inc, and Paramount Communications, Inc, 
§ 1.02(b) (Sept. 12, 1993) (d efining ·'exercise even t" as any of the events described in§ 8.05(b) of 
the merger agreement) (on file with the Norihweslern University Law R eview); A m ended and 
Resta ted Agreement and Plan of Me rger Between Viacom, Inc. and Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc § 8.05(b)(i)-(iv) (O ctobe r 24, 1993) (on fil e with the Northwestern University Law 
Review). 
103 Moreover, "breach" of a m erge r agreement entered into by a bidder and the target's 
board in one sense is no t re ally a breach (of the agreement as a whole, at least; it is a breach of 
the lockup arrangement), since the merger agreement does not become fully en fo rceable until 
the target's shareholde rs approve it. Notice, however, that preliminary sta tus does not always 
preclude a conclusion that jilting a would-be contract partner consti tutes breach. For a dramatic 
recent example, see Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App, 1987), cerr. denied, 
485 us 994 (1 988). 
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First, court scrutiny avoids the need for two separate sales. If the 
costs of a second sale are greater than those of judicial scrutiny, this 
alone would justify limiting the scope of permissible lockup damages , 
an issue explored in more detail below. 104 Moreover , the prospect of 
court scrutiny may both reduce the likelihood of mistake or collusion 
in the first instance105 and increase the parties' incentive to renegoti-
ate those lockups that nevertheless do turn out to be excessive .J06 
Second, Fraidin and H anson 's resale contemplates the lockup 
bidder making the ultima te sale of the target , whereas the target '-s 
managers would ordinarily sell it to the higher valuing bidder after 
court scrutiny of a lockup. Because the target's managers are likely to 
have more information about the target and its existing prospects than 
the lockup bidder, and at least as much informa tion about other po-
tent ial buyers, the target will often be the better seller. In theory, a 
full enforcement regime might offer the best of both worlds, since the 
parties could provide for a supra-expectancy, foreclosing lockup if the 
bidder is the better seller, but forego such a lockup if the target ap-
pears to have a comparative advantage. Yet the possibility of disloy-
alty, mistake, or collusion suggests that this often will not be the real 
reason for the parties' agreement to a foreclosing lockup,107 and as 
noted earlier, lockup bidders often have little interest in reselling to 
another bidder.los 
Finally-and from a descriptive perspective, crucially-limiting 
lockup damages avoids the corporate law process problems that un-
dermine Fraidin and Hanson 's universal enforcement proposal. As 
noted above, invalidating supra-expectancy lockups addresses both 
the foreclosure problem and the risk that target shareholders will be 
forced to accede to an inferior acquisition offer. 109 
Before we consider the principal concerns about judicial scrutiny, 
it is useful to mention two additional insights that the case law and 
literature on liquidated damages suggest for a judicial scrutiny regime. 
104 Notice that, whe reas we considered in subpart liLA the possibility that the second sale 
might never take place, the question here is whether, even if a resal e would occur, judicial scru-
ti ny might be a less costl y means of achi eving the same result. 
105 See, e.g., Rea, supra note 95 , at 162 (nonenforcement of excessive li quidated damages 
provision gives buye r incentive to acquire more information ). 
106 See, e.g., Note, Conrracl Renegocialion, supra note 95. 
107 Moreover, the initial bidder still can locate and resell to a higher valuing bidder if the 
target fails to do so after court scrutiny, whereas the ta rget loses its incentive to look for better 
bidders if it has granted a lockup that e ffecti vely excludes such bidders. 
lOS See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
109 See subpart III.B. The adverse effect that enforcement of a supra-expectancy lockup 
would have on the shareholders' right to make th e fina l decision on an acquisition offe r could 
make the comparison between full enforcement and judicial scrutiny moot as a practical matter. 
Because judicial scrutiny of some sort is inevitable , the rea l question may be what forrn it sho uld 
take. Nevertheless, the comparison between full enforcement and judicial scrutiny is useful be-
cause it serves to illuminate the advantages of the reliance damages approach set forth below. 
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O ne concerns the issue of ex ante, as opposed to ex post reasonable-
ness. As noted above, a court will sometimes uphold a liquidated 
damages provision that is reasonable as of the t ime of the contract, 
even if changed circumstances make it inaccurate by the time the 
promisor breaches. 11 0 Shifting to the lockup context raises the ques-
tion of whether the emergence of a new higher valuing bidder, vvhose 
bid dramatically increases the value of a lockup. hould be treated 
analogously, as a changed circumstance that cloes not affect enforce-
ment of the lockup. 111 Much of the contracts l ite ra ~ure suggests it 
should be. 112 The re liance damages approach described below would 
frequently lead to a different conclusion, however. This is in pan be-
cause a reliance approach would focus initially on the lockup bidder's 
other opportunities at the time of the agreement, rather than simply 
on the emergence of a new bidder. 113 
The analogy to liquidated damages also raises questions about 
what courts should do when they conclude that a lockup is excessive. 
In the liquidated damages context, invalidation is not a complete loss 
for the promisee. Although she loses the windfall of an excessive 
damages provision, the promisee ordinarily can still recover any 
proven actual damages.l14 Courts that strike dovvn a lockup arrange-
ment, by contrast, ordinarily deny any recovery to the bidder in 
question.115 
Why deny any recovery? Courts typically have refused recovery 
based on the conclusion that excessive lockups are part of an overall 
tainted process and must therefore be voided altogether.l 16 The 
problem with this reasoning is that lockups may play a valuable role in 
an auction even if the target 's managers have otherwise acted improp-
11 0 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
111 The Paramounr court was parti cularly troubled by the ex post effects of the Paramount-
Viacom stock lockup, as evid enced by its statement that "[b] ecause the Stock Option Agreement 
was not 'capped' to limit its maximum dollar value, it had th e potential to reach (and in this case 
did reach) unreasonable levels. " Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Ne twork. In c. , 637 
A.2d 34, 39 (De l. 1994). 
112 O n one view, the eme rgence of a new bidder does not constitute a changed circumstance 
at a ll. The initial bidder's expectancy interest can be seen as including th e possibility of resale to 
ano th er bidder. which suggests that th e lock up continu es to be reasonable ex post, despite the 
sudden increase in value. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 23, a t 434 (relevance to expectancy 
inte rest of non breaching party's abi lity to sell to a third party). As described below, my re li ance 
approach leads to a very different focus. 
113 See section III.C. 
11 4 See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290-92 (7th Cir. 1985)(in-
va li da tin g liquidated damages (by classifying them as a penalty) and remanding for dete rmina-
tion of actual damages) . 
115 See Revlon , Inc. v. MacAndrews & Fo rbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183-85 (Del. 
1986) (voiding lockup and cancellation fee). 
116 See, e.g., id. at 184. 
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erly.117 In addition , courts ' ali-or-nothing approach substantially di-
minishes the value of a lockup to the parties, since a bidder can never 
be entirely sure that it will receive any protection at all. 
To better appreciate this point, consider the analogy between 
lockups and fraudulent conveyance law. Fraudulent conveyance stat-
utes strike down any transaction by an insolvent debtor that does not 
give the debtor " reasonably equivalent value" in return. us l h e per se 
nature of these provisions suggests an assumotion that disprooortion-
- \.-' '-' l .... . ... 
ace exchanges by insolvent debtors invariably reflect collusion b e-
c.""' "'.,... thP dobtO'l" a nrl th t=> r a rini"n' of the h·~nsfar t--, t-!-. W?ft the ~ ~v -...... ~ .. 1 .1...... ......... . ~ _~ .... ~.1 ._). ... ..t...:. v .i \,..o~_ • .-J_r \....-.r.. 1.. _,_ 1 ""' ..... u ... .\. \,......1 ~{.._,. ~ 1 w "' -l.t 
debtor 's creditors . Courts that void a lockup altogether appear to do 
so based on similar assumptions . Yet, questionable lockups differ 
frorn classic fraudulent conveyances in several important respects. 
First, it often is quite unclear whether target managers ' granting of a 
malignant lockup does in fac t reflect collusion with the recipien t bid-
der. Second, unlike fraudulent conveyances, which represent an un-
mitigated loss for creditors, questionable lockups often may benefit 
target shareholders-as suggested above-by causing a bidder to 
raise its bid, for instance. B oth of these distinctions reinforce the con-
ciusion that reducing problematic lockups makes far more sense than 
voiding them altogether. 
¥/hat this suggests is that courts should separate the duty of loy-
alty issue from the damages question-on this issue Fraidin and Han-
son seem very much on target in arguing that lockups should be 
completely voided only if side payments or other overt duty of loyalty 
violations are involved-- and courts should more closely track ordi-
nary contract law with respect to damages. I will return to this issue 
below, but for nmv the im portant point is that a strong case can be 
made fo r a regime in which courts scrutinize lockups, much as they 
scrutinize stipulated damages in other contract settings. 
2. Judicial Competence and the Cost of Court Scrwiny.-As wi th 
Fraidin and Hanson 's universal enforcement model, judicial scru tiny is 
not a perfect approach to lockup arrangements. To begin, judicial 
scrutiny entails costs, such as attorneys' fees and the costs of engaging 
other professionals in connection with litigation about the propriety of 
a lockup. Yet, direct costs of this sort are not likely to be overwhelm-
1 17 As Fraidin and Hanson suggest in a somewhat different context, Rev/on appears to be a 
classic case in point. However problematic Revlon's treatment of its two bidders may have been, 
granting a lockup to Forstmann Little & Co. induced Forstmann to increase its bid by a full 
dollar per share after several previous rounds of bidding. Rev/on, 506 A.2d at 178-79; Fraidin & 
Hanson , supra note 9, at 1754. 
llS See, e.g. , UNIF. F RAUD ULENT TRANSFER Acr § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. (1985). 
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ing, and may well be less than the direct costs of the mu.ltiple sales 
required in a full enforcement regime_119 
,~ ',-1' 'T "' d ·' "· ' • 
1..~ra1um ana .rJ. anson o not compare me costs m w e two reg1mes, 
due to their view that courts vvould be so ineffective in distinguishing 
appropriate lockups from excessive ones as to ;;;liminate any virtues 
that a judicial scrminy regime might otherwise have. 1-'o. court ;,vould 
1 ~ • 1 • 1 , ' • • ~ ne.eo to aetel-rrnrlf: a OIClcJer s reservation pr1ce u.nder .8JJ expectai1C~t~· 
based. scrtttirl v of .lockuos for i11stance, sir1ce tb.e Oi(ii t-: r 1S ex1Jectation. 
~· l !. 
ir1terest ea tta ls che diffetei1Ce between its reservatio_n. ·orice and the 
' ' amount it ac tuaLly bids. Yet, courts are particularly ill-sui ted to select 
•L '.r11 S i','u1l''l} bf:·.r, 1 "2{} \,,,·~.! l. C" 'f-1' 1·~1 essr-1.....-:,ro p "r e1:j ~a C"LQ t~1e v:;:::: 11 1P .r/: -r 1-- ) ~ -,L " ._ (Jp -t ~ '-' ''"' .._ ..... ..._ ~ '" , -~ - - .::._ - ~ \....- - J.. .1 ....... v ., 1 1 .-..,-,.L ,.~ .,..... v.l_ • • .-• . ~ ....... ~c:.t 0 ...... L U v C..·~ 
vvhol -~. 121 
Ir1 {Jth er co.n.texts, D el a v;,rare cc,urts a ·~loicl t h :::~ I1e ·~~d to IIlak.e su ·b-
stantive determinations of this sort by focusing on process issues such 
as o.,v hether the parties have engaged in vigorous, a.rrns-length bargain-
ing over terms. i 22 Yet even malignant lockups are likely to be pre-
ceded by hard bargaining, given that the interests of the target's 
directors and the lockup bidder will often diverge not only from those 
of the target's shareholders, but also from those of one another. 123 As 
a result, the courts necessari ly must make a substantive assessment as 
to whether the value of the lockup is excessive. 
Fraidin and Hanson clearly are correct about the difficulty of ju-
dicially making such valuations,124 but this does not mean that such an 
assessment cannot be made. Investment bankers routinely issue pub-
lic predictions as to the likely outcomes- and expected purchase 
price-of corporate acquisitions. In a well-publicized control contest, 
119 No tice tha t some of th ese litigation costs also would be incurred in a full enforcement 
regime;, since !oc:kup issues usually are lirigat ed as part of a general at tad: on t arget directo rs' 
exercise of the ir fiduci ary duties. While fuil enfo rcement of lockups might reduce the number of 
fiduci ary duty chall enges somewhat , it would not eliminate them altogethe r. 
120 f raidin & E anson . supra note 9, at 1775-78. Fraidin and Hanson's skepticism of judicial 
scrutiny close ly paralle ls A lan Schwartz 's doubts about court eva luat ion of liqu idated damages 
provisions. See Sl<p ra note 58. 
121 This is tru e at leas t in a "common vaiues" context, where the value of the targe t is the 
same for each bidde r. If, as is likely, the target is worth more to some than to o thers, bid ders 
would have bidde r-specific reservation prices. A court would therefore need to assess the 
lockup bidde r's partic CJ!R r valu ation. 
122 See Edward B. Rock , Controlling the Dark Side of Re!arional Jnvesiing, 15 C ARDozo L. 
REv. 987 , 1010-:12, 1014 (1994) (questioning the efficacy of such scrutiny in distinguishing good 
and bad relational invest ing) . 
123 I d. (conclu ding similarly about arrangements be tween a corporation and a re la ti onal 
investo r). 
124 Observe rs have long been skeptical of judicial valuation of a firm. Two obvious exampl es 
are corporate law appraisal rights and the valuation a court must make to determine whether the 
absolute priority rule has been sat isfied in bankruptcy. See, e.g. , Douglas G . Baird & Thomas H . 
Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolure Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REv . 738, 779 (1988); Eimer J. Schaefer, The Faliacy of Weighring Asset Value and Earnings 
Value in rhe Appraisal of Corpora te Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REv . 1031 (1982). 
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a court might use these ongoing predictions to supplement the parties' 
partisan assessments. Rather than focus on likely reservation prices, a 
court might also consider the profits a given bidder has historically 
made on acquisitions, or the price other bidders expect from sim ilar 
transactions. i 25 
Moreo;:er, it is important to keep in mind that courts need only 
achieve rough accuracy. 1be difficulty of caiculating actua l damages is 
precise ly y patties liquidate damages in many contractual settings, 
and as nc,tecl earlier, courts view uncertainty as weighing in favor of 
enforcement T11is same reasoning suggests that courts should pre-
svmptive1y '..:phold any lockup that provides a plausible surrogate fo r 
actual d::u:nages. 126 
Finally, the prospect of judicial scrutiny, even if it is relatively 
inaccurat": , c2.n increase the parties' incentive to renegotiate an inap-
propriate lockup. 127 The prospect of judicial scrutiny gives a lockup 
bidder much more reason to consider renegotiating a malignan t 
lockup than it has if it knows the lockup will be enforced. 
In short , while judicial competence would be an issue in a judicial 
scrutiny regime, valuation difficulties do not clearly overwhelm the 
advantages this approach offers in comparison to full enforcement. 
Moreover, much of the difficulty disappears if we reconsider what the 
appropriate perspective on damages should be. 
125 Tnis approach suggests intriguing pa rallels to the "new business" rule in general contract 
law. Und er the new business rule, courts traditionally have refused to awa rd lost profit damages 
to a nonbreaching party whose business does not predate th e contract, due to the diffi culty of 
projecting what its pro fi ts wo uld have been absent the breach. See, e.g., Evergreen Amusement 
Corp. v. 1Vi il stead, 112 A .2d 901, 904-05 (Md. Ct. App. 1955). Courts increasingly have pemlit-
te d a nonbreaching party to attempt to prove likely lost profit s in orde r to give these damages in 
an appropriat e case . See Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372 , 373-74 (Mich . 1976) . 
It is also interesting to note that bidders appear not to have made large profits in connection 
with co rporate acquisitions in the 1980s, thus suggesting that their actual expectancy interest may 
not be great. See, e.g., Michael Bradley et al., Synergisric Gains from Corporare Acquisi1ions and 
rheir Division benveen rhe Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FI1'. EcoN. 3 (1988) 
(fiuding sta tist ically significant negative returns to bidders) ; Rob:::rta Romano, A Guide to Take-
overs: Theory , Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. O N REG. 119 (1992) (describing empirical 
studies and suggesting possible explanations). The existing legal re gime is no doubt at least 
partially responsible for bidders' low profits. This is because the existing regime gives targets 
substantial lee-way against takeovers and encourages auctions when a control contest does 
develop. 
126 Tnus, while :my analysis deviates from Ayres's in many respects, I generally agre e with his 
suggesti on that courts should focus on whether a lockup is beyond the range of reasonableness. 
Ayres, mpra note 8, at 704-05. Fraidin and Hanson may be right th at Ayres 's emphasis on 
unmistakably excessive lock ups overly re laxes the reasonableness inquiry, Fraidin & Hanson, 
supra note 9, a t 1778-79, but their doubts as to the courts' capacity to engage in meaningful 
reasonableness scrutiny seem overstated. 
127 For a detailed discussion and game theoretic demonstration of this argument in the liqui-
dated damages context, see Note, Contract Renegotiation, supra note 95. 
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C. A Reliance Approach to Lockups? 
The analysis thus far has assumed that a well-defined \c1clcup 
'd . ' 1 • J • ' l ~ . d ' .. , , wom g1ve me Dlader I 1e pronts 1t stan s to 10se 1f tne target s m.anag-
ers se ll the target to another bidder--that is, a lockup should m otect a 
jilted bidder's. "expectancy" intefest by putting th~ bidder \;;!here it 
" 1 l 1 ' " • ~ ~ h d. 1 ' ' th 1 A • l . . wou c nao,r;:; oeen u: tde , .ea1 naG gone 1rougn. r'-t easr ·>:~_::: p ·e'l'.-
,~,1"' C""' ~.,,. .... n.·'-o-- ~-,..,a l,..c..-. '=' ..... ~ ... -n; l r-. "' ~ r:- n:--um ~tl.O" l?8 1'7~ C1 ~ ............. ,.... - '.-'-·....., - , ... ,). __ _, Uffi,b•:::llLd t i 111 .. t,. c, .) a ::,~< L.t!rti ·:c;:.c, L<}J · 1,. - · 11 ct ~Cllo;:;, ·-"'· '·; d,,y· 
st~r:nptior is not SliT}JilSl D.g. C e:l.ri·ts and corr1111entatc}rs 112.'1 ,.~ .i(Jilg 
'/ ;e\yad "' ''1JP0 'L- ~'l. r.-,~ ~ - <·1->e "-:~-r,rJn -",-'l -yy>or.~u-e o+ Q'" ··na~ o~ ·Fr ·;-- '--·r· ·"' _ ,...,.~., Q.o • l· t "- vA _t; .. ...-L- aL ULl t:::t ~ t il·_.. ,:o•.O..d. · ....... C~..l ~-~ l ..:..l v a.~ 1 1.. cd b"-'~ J..0.J. U:l•,:;. \.,..J. ! ·i 
contract generally, and by extension for a liquidated clc\mages provi-
s~on. 1 29 Yet a closer look at ~h e ~or~ tract analysis raises serjoqs: CJ')es-
tlons as to whether exDectat:on IS m fact the moper re:rned 'I .Tt the 
.l ~ - j 
lockup context. 130 
C ~ ·d=- n~ -~t ;'I ~ ·tnhJ C' ,.c CnT Of'~ ,,:('! d n ~ c,-: ~ .~ , .,- . > ·; ~ .,-, () D~J. \ . .-1 __ _t;::, _ L.rle .) Ct t ; J Vi ;""'Ap!,..,-....,Lal1VTI ar.na.g\,.....) In C :.)fl · . .!-:::~C t .t r..::tPI . 
'vVhile expectation is seen as the baseline measure, courts in :manv 
cases have long looked to reliance, restitution, and related mea;-
ures.131 In fact , a strong case can be made that reliance-that is, re-
storing an innocent party's pre-contract status-would actually be a 
superior damages measure if courts awarded all of a promisee's reli-
ance losses, including the value of her foregone opportunities. 132 In 
many cases, including many liquidated damages situations, expecta-
tion damages serve as a surrogate for a true reiiance measure . The 
assumption is that, in order to enter into the contract in question, the 
promisee bypassed other, equivalent contracting opportunities.133 In 
consequence, she should be awarded the net value of such an opportu·· 
nity- in other words, lost profit. 
--------------------------------·-
128 Ay res, supra note 8, at 704-07 ("fully insuring" lockups). 
129 See, e.g., RESTATE!<.!ENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 347 cmt. a (1981) ("Contract c!a;·nages 
a re ordinari ly based on the inju red party's expectation interest."); E. AL!..AN F'ARNS\VO RTI-I, 
C m.;TRACTs 40, 812-13, 839 (1982). 
130 As noted earlier, an alternative approach, which Delaware has purported to use in some 
cases, would be to focus not only on bidder damages, but also on whether the target recei·ves an 
adeq uate quid pro quo for the lockup. See supra note 41. Focusing on bidder compensation can 
be seen as a proxy for such an inquiry and is a much more plausible approach due to the diffi-
cul ty in many cases of evaluating the benefits to the target, and to the incentive effects discussed 
in this subpart. 
131 Fuller and Perdue are perhaps best known for pointing this out in their ciassic definition 
and defense of the reliance interest. L.L. Fuller & Willi am R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance lnteresc 
in ContraCf Damages, "!-6 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) . 
132 Charles J. Goe tz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1284, 1287-88 (1980). Goetz and Scott argue that contract law 
should seek to maximize the difference between beneficial reliance-the benefits to a promisee 
when a contract is performed-and detrimental reliance-the costs to her of breach. This sug-
gests that the optimal damages measure would focus on a promisee's re liance interest, including 
any lost opportunities. 
133 This is consistent with Fuller and Pe rdue 's view that expectation damages are most defen-
sible in the market setting. Fulle r & Pe1due, supra note 131, at 65-66. 
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Perhaps the most striking effect of shifting from general contract 
law to the lockup context is the realization that much of the analysis 
above simply does not hold true for lockup arrangements. While a 
manufacturer who enters into a contract with Supplier A qften forgoes 
the opportunity to make similar arrangements wi th Supplier B or Sup-
plier C, bidders often do not have other, similar acquisition opportuni-
ties during the same time frame as their discussions ;,vith the target. 
Tne market for similar target corporations is not nearly so extensive , 
or "thick," as the markets that commentators tend to assume in their 
discussions of contract damages. 134 To be sure, some bidders may 
have multiole acouisition possibilities within a particular time frame. 
1 !. .. 
But even these firms may not have an alternative prospect at the same 
time; and those prospects they do have are likely to differ in signifi·· 
cant respects from the target in question. Because bidders often do 
not have foregone opportunities, reliance rather than expectation 
more accurateiy compensates a bidder for the costs to it of losing an 
acquisition. 135 
On this view courts should focus on costs- such as the expense of 
hiring investment bankers and other experts- that a bidder incurs. 
Other costs, such as the cos t of executive time spent on the takeover 
bid rather than on other firm business, also en tail reliance costs. 136 
The analysis above suggests that reliance may be the best stan-
dard from the perspective of compensation-that is, it better approxi-
mates the real consequences of breach to an initial bidder than an 
expectation measure would. Compensation is not the only relevant 
factor, however. Contracts scholars have often noted that, in addition 
to compensation , the incentive effects of a particular damages mea-
sure also must be taken into account. 137 As the analysis below sug-
gests, reliance also is the best measure from the perspective of bidder 
and target incentives. 
The principal advantage of a reliance measure, as compared to 
expectation, is its effect on promisee (bidder, in the lockup context) 
134 Finns such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., whose principal business is engaging in 
acquisi tion activity, come somewhat closer to the manufacturer-supplier illustration, as do indus-
tries that a re undergoing rapid consolidation, such as the defense contracting and information 
technology industries in recent years. Yet , both fall well short of being truly thick markets. 
135 As the analysis below will show, focusing on a bidder 's reliance damages would not e limi-
nate altogether the possibility of including lost profits in the damages calculation. Instead, 
rather than simply assuming lost profits, as the expectation m easure does, reliance shifts the 
burden of demonstrating this measure to the nonbreaching party (he re, the bidder). 
136 Goetz and Scott refer to this aspect of reliance, which reflects a change in the bidder's 
pa tte rn of consumption, as "consequential' ' reliance. Goetz & Scott, supra note 132, at 1297. 
137 See, e.g., Rea, supra note 95, at 152 (stat ing that damage measure must achieve a compro-
mise between optimal insurance and optimal precautions); see also Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, 
Contracr, and Properry: The Model of Precaurion , 73 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985) (noting that compen-
sation can conflict with giving both parti es appropriate incentives to take precaution). 
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incentives. B ecause it assures a bidder the benefit of the agreement at 
hand, expectation gives the bidder inadequate incentives to mi tigate 
the consequences of breach by continuing to look for other opportuni-
ties .1 38 By contrast, a reliance measure would limit recovery to actual 
losses, and thus discourage a bidder from overcommitting to any par-
ticular acquisition. 
In contrast to its beneficial effect on promisee incentives , the re li-
ance measure does not a lways give equally appropriate incentives to a 
promisor. E fficien t breach theorists have long argued , for instance, 
that because it does not assure the promisee the full benefit of its bar-
gain, reliance gives a promisor too great an incentive to breach. O n 
this view, expectation offers the advantage of deterring a promisor 
from breaching its contract in order to take advantage of an alterna-
tive contract unless the new contract is truly superior. 139 
Even in the contracts context, this analysis is subject to significant 
caveats. While reliance may give a promisor too great an incentive to 
breach, for instance, it often gives the promisor superior incentives 
with respect to other aspects of the contracting process. 140 
More importantly for present purposes , however, there is little 
reason to be concerned about "excessive" promisor breach in the 
lockup context. The agreement between an initial bidder and a target 
is preliminary by its very nature. If a higher valuing bidder emerges, 
the parties arguably contemplate-and efficient breach theory would 
encourage-the target 's sale to the higher bidder. 'Nhile a reliance-
based measure might appear to give target managers an incentive to 
shift to another bidder even in circumstances where the new bidder 
does not value the target more highly, this possibility is far less prob-
lematic with respect to corporate control contests than elsewhere. In 
contrast to other promisees, the lockup bidder does not simply disap-
pear if another bidder emerges. The lockup bidder still can attempt to 
outbid the new bidder, and it is likely to succeed unless the new bid-
138 For an importan t discussion of thi s point, and an elaborate criticism of contract theorists' 
trad iti onal assumption that contract doctrine does and should provide for strict liabil ity and e;-;-
pectation dam ages for all breaches, see Geo rge M. Cohen, The Faul£ Lines in Contract Damages, 
80 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1994) . ' 
139 This is because expectation damages force a promiso r to fully internalize the costs of a 
breach-a promisor will not breach unl ess the promiso r can pay the promisee the benefit of its 
ba rgain in damages and still profit from ente ring into an alte rnative contract. See, e.g. , A . 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN lNTRODUCfiON TO LAW AND E CONOMICS 33 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD 
A. PosNER, EcoNOM IC A NA LYSIS OF LAw 108 (3d ed. 1986). The whole no tion of efficient 
breach has itse lf been subject to extensive criticism. See, e. g., Ian R. Macne il, Efficietu Breach of 
Comract: Circles in 1he Sky , 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982) . 
140 See, e.g. , David D. Friedman, An Economic Analysis of Alternmive Damage Rules for 
Breach of Comract, 32 J.L. & E coN. 281 (1 989) (concluding that re liance leads to m ore efficient 
decisions regarding whether and to wh at extent to ente r into a contract). 
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incentiY';; !: o anticipate and mitigate any losses should the deal with the 
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Yet, the z,tgurilent for a reliance approach rernains equally powerful 
once these benefits are taken into accoun t. In the conventional view, 
lockups serve to encourage a bidder to participate in bidding by assur-
ing the bidder that its costs will be compensated. A t least if construed 
to include both pre-bid and subsequent expenses, as it sho uld be, this 
is exactly what a reliance measure is designed to do.143 The reliance 
measure also should counteract the problems of parties' differing ex-
pectations, or of a bidder 's hesitancy to enter an auction, since repay-
ment of costs should be sufficient to entice a reluctant bidder to bid 
for the target. To be sure, a bidder might be concerned about truly 
receiving all of its costs in either of these situations. Bu t so long as 
141 Another concern about the reliance standard is that it may cause a bidder to ove rrely-
that is, to invest too many resources in the contract-beca use a ll such expenditures can be re-
cove red in the event of a breach. Steven Shavell, Damage lV/e(lsures for Breach of Comracr, 11 
BELL J. Eco;'l. 466, 472 (1980); see also Coote r, supm note 137, at 30-31 (a rguing that liqu idated 
damages provisions iimit ove rre li ance by making damages invarian t to the amo unt of re liance) . 
But courts <::an and do coun teract any such incentive by using the mi tiga ti on , foreseeability, and 
certainty doct rir-.es to disallow excessive or inapprop riate expenditii res. Cohen, supra note 138, 
at 12i~9 ; W. Davi d Slawson , The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages , 76 CORNELL L. REv. 197, 
230-31 (1990) . lt is also inte resting to note that these sam:: limita ti ons frequent ly lead courts to 
avvard what is in effect reliance damages even when they purport to apply an expectation mea-
sure. That is, the mitigation, foreseeabili ty, and certainty !imitations tend to move the recovery 
away Irom expectation and toward reliance. Cohen, supra note 138, at 1249. 
142 A recent article by G eorge Cohen parallels the analysis above in many respects. Cohen 
suggests that reliance is attractive where promisee incentives are a greater concern than opportu-
nis tic breach by the promisor. Cohen, supra note 138, at 1309-10. Th is seems tru e of corporate 
lockups. ln the particular context of "supe rior alternat ives," Cohen argues that re li ance dam -
ages are appropriate if the promisor is better situated to take advantage of a superio r alternative, 
where as expectation or higher damages are app ropriate (since they chiil the promisor's incent ive 
w bread1) if the proiT'isee can better make the alternative sale . Cohen, supra note 138, a t 1297-
1302. In the lockup context, the target arguably is the more appropriate seller due to th e 
problems wi th bidder resale discussed in Part III. 
143 In other contracts contexts, the question whether courts should award p re-con tract reli-
ance is a matter of dispute. As the text suggests, the nonnat ive case fo r including pre -con tract 
re liance is pa1ticu!arly st rong in the lock up context, given that compensati ng a bidder for its 
costs is an impo rtant goal of lockups. 
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courts are generous in upholding lockups that provide a plausi b1e esti-
mation of costs, this concern is easily addressed. 
·while several of Ihe benefits Fraidin and Hanson a!: triblt !:E: to 
lockups might seem more difficult to achieve under a reliance-b2sed 
framework , the real value of each of the benefits is highly questiona-
ble, as discussed earlie r. For instance, a reliance-based lock up ar;:!:Ua-
bly vvou1d not encourage as much search by a potential biclcl·~; r as ~Jn e 
that gti c. ranteed the bidder its expectancy interest in t.h~ -~ven.:: that 8. 
higher valuing bidder emerged, 144 since the beneJh to u·;_e b idder 
v.;ould be substant ially lower. Ye t this adverse impact 0::1 a bidder's 
incen tive to act as a "sales agent" does not seem particuJar1y problcrn-
• • 1 1 "[1 c b J ~r · n at1c, g1ven tnat tne target W L t mten · e a t eas t as e:necu ve 8, :-;e;uer as 
the bidder, and the bidde r still has an incentive to seek OUJ o cher bid-
ders after it has acq uired the target.l 45 Moreover, lockups can under-
mine as well as enhance search, since target m anagers can atter:npt to 
use them to thwart an undesired bidder. Similarly, a reliance -based 
approach would preclude the bidder and the target from using a 
lockup collusively, in order to divert some of a higher valuing bidder 's 
profits, but the risk that such a lockup would have malignant, ra ther 
than beneficial, effects raises doubts as to whether this is a desirable 
lockup goal in any event. 146 
A final possible concern is the effect that a reliance m easure 
would have on the parties ' use of a lockup to counter risk aversion. 
R ecall that a lockup can be used to allocate risk in the event that 
either the lockup bidder or the target is, or both are, risk averse .147 
E ven here, it is questionable whether greater than reliance damages 
are likely to be necessary. First, the principal role for a risk aversion-
based lockup would be to address the bidder's risk aversion ,148 and it 
is not clear how serious a concern bidder risk aversion is or shot:ld b·~ . 
G iven the amounts a t stake, a bidder may have concerns as to 'Nhe ther 
the acquisition of the target will prove profitable , as Fraidin and H an-
son suggest. 149 But these concerns seem most significan t af ter the ac-
144 See subpart LC (lockups as encouraging search) . 
145 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
146 See subpa rt II. B (effects of collusion). 
147 See subpart LB. 
14 8 While a lockup also could be used to respond to target risk aversion, see Frai din & H an-
son, supra note 9, at 1823, a simple r and more direct response to target risk ave rsion would be to 
include a liquidated damages provision giving the larger a specified amount of damages in the 
event the bidde r breaches the parti es' agreement. Moreover, because ta rget share holde rs usually 
can diversify their portfolio, they should not be risk averse. To the extent that the ta rget 's man-
age rs are risk ave rse due to their concentrated investment in th e ta rget, limi ting lock ups to the 
bidder's reliance interest may help curb the managers ' tendency to act on th eir risk aversion to 
the detriment o f sha rehold ers. 
149 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1823 (citing R. Preston l\kAfee & John McMill an, 
A uctions and Bidding, 25 J. EcoN. Lrr . 699, 726 (1987)) (suggesting th at pa rt ies are m ore risk 
ave rse when they have substantia l percentage of their assets at st ake) . 
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quisition has taken place, when the bidder has actually incurred the 
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less likely to be a source of risk aversion on the part of bidders. Sec-
ond, it is importan.t to keep in mind that any benefit that an expec-
tancy-based (or higher) lockup offers must be 'Neighed against its 
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The discussicn t h \JS sugges ts that lockups should be treated both 
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other liquidated damages provisions, courts should subject lockups to 
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b.' ' - ' 0 • '1 . . -weer olten nas not toregone any 5EY1Lar opportumtws; because 
breach is less problernatic in this context; and in order to create appro-
priate incentives, hmvever, courts should use reliance rather than ex-
pectation as the basic yardstick in measuring appropriate damages_Iso 
D. Distinctions Between Initial and Subsequent Bidder Lockups 
TI1e analysis thus far has considered lockups in general terms, 
without focusing on when in the acquisition process, and to whom, the 
target grants a lock up. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish at least 
two ki.:lds of lockups. Targets grant some lockups to the first bidder, 
often in connection with an agreement reached in the absence of any 
other bidder. Other lockups can be described as second or subse-
quent bidder lockups. Tnese lockups often are granted in response to 
a hostile bid by an initial bidder, and the managers of a target may use 
such a lockup to entice another bidder into the bidding. 
Subsequent bidder lockups arguably are more likely to be malig-
nant than initial bidder lockuos.151 Because an initial bidder's costs 
.t 
may exceed those of subsequent bidders, an initial bidder arguably has 
more need for lockup protection. 152 By contrast, target managers can 
use subsequent bidder lockups to subsidize a challenge by a friendly 
bidder , and thus to thwart a hosti le initial bidder.153 
One possible question these observations raise is whether the dis-
tinctions among lockups undermine the attractiveness of applying a 
150 Notice that this analysis also raises interesting qu estions as to whether expectation dam-
ages are an appropriate yardstick in other liquidated damages contexts. Because the promisee 
often will have foregone similar opportunities when it entered into the contract, expectation 
damages frequentl y will be appropriate. But this may not always be the case, as the lockup 
context makes c!ear. 
151 See Kahan & Klausn er, supra note 10 (reaching a similar conclusion about subsequent and 
initial bidder lockups) . 
152 Other bidders may free -ride on the initial bidder's efforts to .identify the target as a good 
candidate for takeover, for instance. The initial bidder may therefore have sunk costs that a 
subsequent bidder would not need to incur. 
153 Notice that such lockups have th e chilling effect on incentives to search that were dis-
cussed in Part I. 
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reliance damages approach to all lockups. For at least two reasons, 
they do not. First, not a ll initial bidder lockups are benign, since tar-
get managers can use an initial bidder lockup not only to encourage 
an initial bidder but also to preempt any subsequent, potentially hos-
tile bid.154 Similarly, because subsequent bidder lockups can be used 
to encourage competitive bidding, they are not always malignant from 
target shareholders' perspeclive. A n im portan t attraction of tbe reli-
ance damages approach is that it mediates among the benefits and 
potential problems with lock ups . The reliance damages measure is re-
strictive enough to impose significant limits on the parties' ability to 
use lockups in an inappropriate fashion, yet it does not undermine the 
beneficial use of lockups. 
Second, the reliance damages measure could easily be used to ac-
count for the general differe nces between initial and subsequent bid-
der lockups. Courts could apply the standard more flexibly in the 
initial bidder context than with subsequent bidders , for instance, by 
applying a more stringent presumption against recovery of opportu-
nity costs in the subsequent bidder context, or even by limiting subse-
quent bidders to reimbursement costs. One suspects that courts 
would make at least some adjustments of this sort, much as they do in 
applying the reliance measure in contract law generally.1ss It is inipor-
tant not to overstate the usefulness of this flexibility, however. A ma-
jor difficulty in scrutinizing corporate lockups is that courts often 
cannot easily determine whether a particular lockup (or category of 
lockups) is malignant, and even problematic lockups may offer appre-
ciable benefits. One of the most important advantages of the reliance 
damages approach, and of assessing all lockups in reliance terms, is 
that it minimizes the need for courts to make difficult determinations 
as to the nature of the parties' motives in any given case. 
E. Summary and an Application: the Proposed Scheme 
The foregoing analysis suggests a simple reliance damages model 
of judicial scrutiny, comprised of two distinct steps. vi/hen a lockup 
arrangement is challenged, a court should begin with the duty of loy-
alty issue. If the lockup can be traced directly to a side deal or other 
154 Paramount may well have been an exam ple of this, given Pa ramount 's di rectors ' apparent 
desire to thwart QVC. See Paramount Communicati ons, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. , 637 A.2d 
34, 39 (Del. 1994) (discussing effo rts by Paramount to discourage QVC from m aking a bid). 
155 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 138, at 1249-51 (discussing devices th at can be used to limit 
re liance, such as denial of lost opportunities an d use of reasonableness, foreseeability, ce rtainty, 
and mitigation limitations). 
Similarly , one can imagine courts appl ying a measure other t han reliance in a truly excep-
tional case. Yet, the particular dynamics of lockups and the corporate acqu isition con text so 
regularly will call for a reliance standard that a strong presumption in fav or of reliance is war-
ranted. The number of cases whe re anoth e r stand ard wo uld be app ropriate wo uld , in my opin-
ion, be extremely small. 
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overt violation of loyalty, it should be voided altogether.l56 In the 
absence of an overt violation, however, courts should shift from loy-
:cilcy to the second reliance damages step, a determination whether the 
lclClu lp reflects a reasonable stipulation of the bidder 's likely reliance 
losses should the deal fall through . If courts do award more than an 
iniiial bidder 's out-of-pocket and related costs, they should do so only 
if bidder can demonstrate an actual or highly probable opportu-
-;u l:Jss. Given the uncertainty as to actual damages, 157 courts should 
uphold any lockup that reflects a credible es timation of damages as of 
the tirne of the parties' agreement, as they do in other liquidated dam-
? CJ P <' <',P .l'·t J' n 'JC -·c· v .J .. .... ·~ . .t ~ u~ · 
Other than the shift in damages measure, the most significant 
chartge :)uggested by the reliance approach arises when the target's 
mana.gers have not overtly violated their duty of loyalty (i.e. , the 
lockup passes the initial scrutiny), but a court invalidates the lockup as 
excessive at the reliance damages stage. Courts and commentators 
currently hold that a bidder is not entitled to any compensation what-
soever if its lockup is struck down. As noted above, this ali-or-nothing 
approach seriously undermines the benefit to a lockup bidder. A bet-
ter approach would permit the bidder to demonstrate its actual, prov-
able damages if the lockup is disallowed, just as promisees with 
liquidated damages provisions may do in other contractual settings. 
Because lockups typically are challenged at the preliminary in-
junction stage, giving a bidder its actual damages when a lockup is 
struck down raises a question as to whether a court should calculate 
these damages at the time of the initial challenge, or thereafter. The 
simplest answer is that a court need only decide whether or not to 
uph-old the lockup (and what kinds of damages it intends to allow) at 
trie preliminary injunction stage. Actual damages can be determined 
after the sale of the target is final. To be sure, postponing the determi-
nation would create uncertainty for other bidders as to how much the 
lockup bidder must be paid. But there would be no need ever to 
make the determination if the lockup bidder eventually won out,158 
and the uncertainty would not be great. 
156 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
15 7 r.;Iany of the costs that a bidder al ready has incurred a re relative ly certain ; howeve r the 
patties ordinarily wi ll not know what additional expenses to expect , because they cannot predict 
with accuracy what additional costs th e initial bidder will incur if a new bidde r emerges. 
l5 8 The Paramount takeove r contest is an obvious example of how this could happen. See 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); see also QVC 
Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc. 635 A.2d 1245 (De l. Ch. 1993). A lthough 
Vi acom's initial me rger agreement (including its lock up provisions) was struck down , Viacom 
still eventually won the auction. Had the De laware Supreme Court adopted the approach in the 
tc::xt, there would have been no need to determine Vi acom's actual compensation. The facts of 
the Paramount contest are explored in greate r detail at th e end of this section. 
602 
90:564 (1996) Corporate Lockups 
Two final questions also warrant brief discussion. The first is how 
courts should treat lockup arrangements that include multiple parts-
for instance , one designed to insure some or all of the bidder 's profits, 
and ano ther that covers the bidder's out-of-pocket costs .159 Delaware 
has tended to strike all of the provisions if the court concludes that the 
arrangement as a whole is excessive.160 H owever, it appears more 
sensible to uphoid a reasonable termination fe e even if the stock 
lockup is struck down as unwarranted, at least if it is clear that the t-vvo 
rn::::asures are in tended to cover different aspects of a bidder's poten-
tial losses. 
Second , initial bidders often buy a little less than ten percent of a 
target's stock in order to hedge their bet prior to ma kL.1 g a bid. An 
obvious question in this context is whether a court should take into 
account in its assessment of the ini tial bidder's lockup any profits an 
initial bidder makes by eventually selling these shares to a higher bid-
der.161 The ans wer clearly is yes. If the initial bidder received both 
these profits and full reliance damages under its lockup, even a reli-
ance-based lockup would overcompensate the initial bidder for its 
losses. In a sense, then, an initial bidder 's stock purchase can be seen 
as a form of precontract mitigation that a court should incorporate 
in to its analysis .162 
To better appreciate how the approach would work in a more 
concrete setting, consider the facts of the Paramount acquisition in 
greater detail. The lockup Paramount agreed to consisted of a $100 
million termination fee, together with an option to purchase slightly 
iess than twenty percent of Paramount 's stock at the price of Viacom's 
bid in the event Paramount abandoned the merger agreement for an-
other bid. In contrast to the Delaware Supreme Court decision, 
159 Whil e the parti es usually employ stock or asset lock ups to guarantee a bidder 's p rofi ts, 
and fix ed fees to cover its costs, multipart lockups could also be structured in other ways. 
160 A tension between th e chancery and supreme court decisions in Paramount casts interest-
ing light on this. The chancery court struck down Viacom 's stock lockup but upheld the $100 
million te tmination fee that would have covered, among o th er things, Viacom's costs. QVC 
Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d at 1270 -73. Pa ramount did not 
appeal the decision to uphold the termination fee, but the supreme court suggested that it would 
also have struck this fee down had the issue been appealed. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
QVC Network, Inc. , 637 A.2d 34, 50-51 ; see also Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 327-32 (arguing 
that lock up provisions should be taken as a whole). 
161 My th anks to Ed Rock for bringing this issue and some of its implications to my attenti on. 
162 From another perspective, the stock purchase could be seen as a bidde r's means of hedg-
ing against its reliance costs. See generally Cooter, supra note 137, at 16 (noting that mitigation 
and reliance are "identical but for tim e") . Another issue is whether an initial bidder should be 
"required" to engage in this form of mitigation-that is , whether courts should conside r th e 
possibili ty of prebid stock purchases even if the bidder has not engaged in them. The answe r 
here would appear to be no, given, among other things , the difficulty of determining how m uch 
stock a bidd er might real istically have purchased while still keeping its intended acquisition 
secret. 
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which suggested that the magnitude of the stock lockup and the 
tainted nature of Paramount's decision-making pro-::ess required that 
the lockup be voided altogether, 163 a court rnight o,vc:L L~phold the ter-
mination fee under a reliance approach. The $100 million fee was ex-
plicit ly designed to compensate Viacom for its expected out-of-pocket 
and related costs and, while perhaps on the generous side.; can be seen 
as a p lausible projection of Viacom 's costs. 164 
By contrast, the reliance model would only upr:o1c1 e:dditional 
. ' h k . . ,. ., 1 1 'r compensatwn-nere, t e stoc opt10n portiOn ()J: ':lle ,oc,-::1..>p-n 
Viacom could demonstra te that its negotiations and. ;:c g:reement forced 
it to forgo other opportunities that would have both come to fruition 
and produced profits roughly equiva lent to the likely value of the 
lockup. Interestingly, Viacom appears to have made an argument of 
this sort in its negotiations with Paramount. Nevertheless, it seems 
doubtful that Viacom could show that it did in fact forgo similar op-
portunities during the same time frame .165 On the contrary, the Para-
mount deal was a singular event from Viacom's perspective.l66 Thus, 
a court would uphold the termination fee but not Viacom's stock 
option. 167 
As this illustration suggests, the most dramatic practical differ-
ence between the reliance approach and an expectancy-based or 
universal enforcement regime is that stock options and similar ar-
rangements would be more difficult to justify. In order to invoke a 
lockup that extended well beyond its likely out-of-pocket costs, a bid-
der would have to show that it gave up other, similar opportunities-
that is , that the lockup was designed to compensate real losses. As 
noted earlier, such a case would be strongest in an ind ustry rhat is 
undergoing rapid consolidation.168 
! 63 Paramourzr, 637 A.2d at 50-51. 
164 Vice Chancellor Jacobs took a similar view of the te rmina ti on fee in his chancery court 
decision in Paramoun1. 635 A.2d at 1271. 
165 In addi tion to th e compensation-related foc us on io5t opportuni tie:s, the goal of giving 
Viacom appropriate mitigation incentives would also counsel against upho lding the stock option. 
166 Note also that , although Viacom was the first bidder-and ini tial bidder lock ups generally 
are less problematic than lockups to subsequent bidders-Paramount 's dire•: tors clearly wished 
to preempt a QVC bid. Under such circumstances, co urts shou ld be pa rticularly hesitant to 
award lost opportunity costs. See supra subpart IV.D. 
167 Notice that this analysis suggests the Delaware Chancery Court reached a more sensible 
resul t than the Delaware Supreme Court in the actual case. See supra notes 160 & 164. 
168 The Delaware Supreme Court ex pressed particular concern about the parties' failure to 
impose a cap on the value of the stock option. Paramount, 637 A .2d at 39. Caps are much more 
the exception than the norm in practice. See, e.g., Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1761. 
Tnus, while the court's outrage was puzzling to many observe rs , capping a stock option would be 
one way for a bidder to enhance enfo rceabi lity under the reliance approach. Even if it could not 
make a compelling case as to lost opportunities, a bidder could use such an option for a limited 
profit in th e event the target 's managers ultimately so ld the target to another bidder. 
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The reliance model described in this section would not be perfect. 
Ye t , it offers a coherent approach to corporate lockups that avoids 
r:1any of t!:1e pitfalls both of the existing case law, and of a world where 
e 1 • cc,r.Ets em:orce every ,ocKup. 
CoNCLUSION 
Hanson make a pmverful case for blanket enforce-
and in the process reveal serious fl aws in both 
crea tm,~nt and previous commentators' analysis of these orovi-
• 1 
~1ons . Full enforcen:tent proves much more problematic on inspection , 
hc,xever, than Fraidin and Hanson's optimistic assessment of market 
behavior leads them to conclude. Not onlv does a reliance dama~es 
_~ -- a ~ 
approach like the one proposed seem more attractive normatively 
than unblinking enforcement, but also, given the inevitability that 
courts will engage in some kind of scrutiny in order to prevent the 
process problems that excessive lockups would inevitably create, it is 
far more realistic from a descriptive perspective . 
The reliance damages approach suggests that, while continuing to 
subject lockups to judicial oversight, Delaware courts should change 
their approach in several important respects. Most importantly, 
rather than simply treating lockups as part of the overall issue of di-
rectorial loyalty in the takeover context, Delaware courts should sepa-
rate the loyalty and damages inquiries. Nor, in the absence of an 
overt duty of loyalty violation, should courts focus upon issues such as 
whether the lockup confers a "substantial benefit" on the target.169 
R ather , courts should assess whether the lockup is a reasonable esti-
mate of a bidder's damages, measured in reliance terms. If a court 
strikes down a lockup as excessive, a bidder still should be entitled to 
prove irs ?tctual damages. 
The analysis of this Article also has i..'Ilportant implications for 
corporate law scholarship generally. The contractarian analysis of 
corporation issues has proved extraordinarily fruitful in the last dec-
ade. The insights it has made possible are difficult to dispute, despite 
the fact that, as has often been pointed out, contractarian scholars fre-
quently employ a limited, even simplistic view of contract. 170 As this 
F\:rticle has attempted to demonstrate in the particular context of cor-
porate lockups, a more systematic and nuanced consideration of the 
nature of corporate contracting may offer a new round of insights into 
the problems of corporate law. 
169 See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1988). For 
Fraidin and Hanson's discussion of some of this approach's problems, see Fraidin & Hanson, 
supra note 9, at 1748-54. 
170 'Nilli8.m Bratton is perhaps best known for this critique. William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
"Nexus of Ccnrrac!s" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 Co~'ELL L. REv. 407 (1989). 
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